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Abstract 
 
The most important tools in banking supervisory in the last years are the so-called Stress Tests. 
This instrument has been introduced in United States in 2009, immediately followed by 
European Union in the same year. 
In this dissertation, in accordance with the past years’ academic literature, the aim of the author 
is to investigate whether the key events of the stress test lead to shocks in banking stock’s 
market. In particular, for the first time in literature, the point of view of the work is corporate 
oriented rather than macroeconomic oriented, since the focus of the analysis is to establish 
which type of banks react in a stronger manner to these events. In order to do this, five macro-
categories of bank are investigated: Dimension, Capitalization, Profitability, Riskiness and Test 
Performance. The so-called Event Study Technique has been implemented to perform the 
econometric analysis. The results, explicated in Chapter 5 and in Final Remarks of this thesis, 
show that there are evidences of an impact in stock’s market due to the three most important 
events of the stress test (Announcement, Scenarios Disclosure and Publication of Results) that 
are different in significance and magnitude for different type of banks.  
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Chapter One: An Overview of Stress-testing  
 
The 2008 financial and banking crisis, started in US with the fall of housing prices and the 
subsequent crisis of subprime mortgages, exploited the fragility of the banking sector not only 
in the United States but also in the EU-area through a contagion effect due to the deep 
interconnection and internationalization that characterizes the banking industry (Ghosh 2016, 
Dungey et al. 2015, Dungey et al. 2018). 
 
One of the crucial aspects of this situation was the incapacity of banking supervisory authorities 
to properly assess whether financial firms could effectively bear the risks coming from 
deterioration of macroeconomic conditions and the successive loss of confidence by markets 
and surveillance authorities in banking sector. 
In order to overcome this situation and restore trustworthiness, authorities began to search 
alternative methods to assure the stability of financial system and in particular the capital 
adequacy of institutions that went beyond Basel I and Basel II that were already in force at the 
time. 
The results of this effort are the introduction of new set of rules common for every country 
about banking surveillance and risk assessment, the so-called Basel III, and the assessment of 
the ability of the bank to bear losses deriving from adverse macroeconomic condition trough 
the so-called Stress Tests. 
 
Several studies support the use of stress test as a procedure to increase transparency and restore 
confidence in the financial industry.  
For instance, Jordan et al. (2000) supported the idea that the announcement and the disclosure 
of results of supervisory acts helps to diminish the information asymmetry that characterizes 
the relationship between banks and investors. 
Other authors that support this perspective are Sorge & Virolainen (2006), Besancenot & 
Vranceau (2011), Lazzari et al. (2017). 
 
The first institution to perform Stress Test as assessment of capital adequacy of banks was the 
Federal Reserve System in the so-called Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), in 
which in February 2009, the FED embarked on a comprehensive and simultaneous assessment 
of the capability of bearing losses by the largest 19 US bank holding company. 
The necessity of this program was also stated by the at-the-time New York Federal Reserve 
President and CEO William C. Dudley in a speech in March 2009: “I believe this program is 
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very important if we are to break the adverse dynamic that I outlined early… many bank holding 
companies don’t have an incentive to raise sufficient capital to ensure that they can handle a 
very bad outcome. That is because such capital-raising would severely dilute existing 
shareholders. This implies that, left to their own devices, banks might end up being 
undercapitalized in a stress environment.” 
Investors positively reacted to the assessment (Hirtle et al. 2009) and even if they were capable 
to anticipate the banks with possible capital shortfall in an adverse scenario, the SCAP revealed 
them the size of the gap (Peristiani et al. 2010). 
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), that was the institution in charge to 
EU banking surveillance from 2004 to 2011, performed their version of stress test called EU-
wide stress testing in May 2009 and release the results on October of the same year. 
 
As opposed to the SCAP, the 2009 EU-wide stress testing failed to restore confidence in EU 
banking system (Spargoli 2012). 
Other criticisms about EU-wide stress test arose in December 2011 when Dexia, a french-
belgian bank, defaulted despite it had passed the previous test (Xoual, 2013). 
From that time several other stress tests were executed both in US and EU. Many studies have 
been made in order to understand the impact of this tool in the banking sector. The literature 
section of this work will describe in a detailed manner the results of these studies. 
 
1.1 How Stress Tests are implemented 
 
In order to properly analyse the impact of Stress Test on stock market, it is important to have a 
general knowledge of its functioning. 
There are two types of stress-testing: micro and macro. The first one is used to assess the 
performance of a single portfolio or the resilience of a single institution. The second one is used 
to assess the stability of a group of financial institution which default would have a huge impact 
on the stability of the economy as a whole (Borio et al. 2014). 
Obviously, since the stability of the financial system is the main task of EBA, the EU-wide 
stress tests are macro stress test.  
The figure 1.1 illustrates an example of macro stress testing. 
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FIGURE 1.1 / HOW A STRESS TEST IS CONDUCTED.  SOURCE: C. BORIO ET AL. / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 12 (2014) 3–15 
 
There are two types of approach in macro stress-testing: 
• Bottom-up, if the central authority gives a common scenario to each institution that use 
their own model to estimate the impact of the adverse macroeconomic condition in their 
performance and then the central authority aggregates the results. 
• Top-down, if the central authority uses their own model to estimate the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks on financial stability without the direct participation of the 
single institutions in the process (Borio et al. 2014). 
 
Another classification of stress test is whether the institutions perform a Sensitivity Analysis or 
a Scenario Analysis. 
In particular: 
• Sensitivity analysis, if the test is conducted only on a single variable, keeping constant 
all the remaining factors. Easier and faster to implement, but it lacks plausibility since 
it does not consider the contagion effect that a shock on one variable could have on the 
other variables. (Ex. The impact of a change in the interest rate on credit risk.) 
• Scenario analysis, if the test considers the impact of more variables on risk portfolios or 
on the institution itself. It is more plausible since it considers also the contagion effect 
that could arise.  
A further classification of scenario analysis could be made regarding the approaches used in 
the forecast of the future scenario: 
• Historical: based on observed event from the past. Easier to compute but possibly 
irrelevant; 
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• Hypothetical: based on forecast of plausible events that are not realized yet. More 
difficult to apply since it requires a number of experts that are able to make proper 
projections about future events, but more informative then the historical approach. 
 
If we focus on the type of scenario, we can distinguish: 
• Event-driven Scenario: based on a specific event independent of portfolio 
characteristics.  
• Portfolio-driven Scenario: directly linked to the portfolio composition. 
• Macroeconomic Scenario: assess the impact on the institution of a shock in the whole 
economy. 
• Market Scenario: focus on shock of financial and/or market nature. 
• Worst case / Catastrophic Scenario: Exogenous events to the market or economy that 
have a great impact on institutions (ex. terrorist attack). 
 
1.2 EU Stress Tests before 2016 
 
From the first EU-wide Stress Test in 2009 there were other four stress test. 
After the failure of the first two stress test in restoring confidence in EU market, CEBS went 
on retirement in 2010 and in its place European Banking Authority (EBA) were instituted.  
The 2011 EU-wide Stress Test was the first conducted by EBA that in an attempt to improve 
the work made by its predecessor, expanded the disclosure of results. Candelon and Sy (2015) 
proved that this test had a negative effect on stock market returns of tested banks.  
Since the market reacted, then new information was priced, and this means a decrease in term 
of opaqueness in banking industry, thus this result showed that markets began to have more 
confidence in this tool and in the institution in charge to prosecute it. 
 
To understand why EU-markets did not rely on the past stress tests and the evolution of 
themselves, it is crucial to make a brief summary of the tests conducted before 2016. 
 
1.2.1 CEBS 2009 EU-Wide Stress Test 
 
This was the first stress test in EU-area. As stated by CEBS, the main goal of this test was not 
to identify banks that may have need of recapitalization, since the main idea at the time was 
that national authorities were the only institutions with the prerogative to ask for a 
capitalization, but to assess the general condition of EU banking system. 
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Although the common scenario for the institutions subject to stress test was released jointly 
with the results at EU-aggregate level, nor the individual results of banks, nor the list of 
institutions stressed have been disclosed. CEBS affirmed only that the sample was formed by 
banks of 22 Member States that held 60% of total assets in EU banking system. 
 
Regarding the assumption, from the table 1.1, released by CEBS at the end of the exercise, the 
forecast is based on the macroeconomic environment of 2008 and the first half of the 2009. It 
is composed by a baseline projection on GDP and Unemployment rate of European Union, 
Eurozone and United States and an adverse scenario of the same parameters on the same areas. 
Nonetheless the projections were negative for both variables and the adverse scenario looks 
severe, as we will see, the successive stress tests will have a stronger difference in the two 
scenarios. 
 
This, along with the non-disclosure of the individual results of stressed institution, is the 
principal cause of the failure of the first EU-wide stress test. 
 
 
TABLE 1.1 / MAIN MACRO-ECONOMIC ASSUMPTION APPLIED IN THE EXERCISE. SOURCE: CEBS’S PRESS RELEASE ON THE RESULTS OF 
THE EU-WIDE STRESS TESTING EXERCISE, CEBS 2009 
 
In regard to aggregate results, according to CEBS, in the baseline scenario banks’ aggregate 
Tier 1 ratio is well above 9% (over the minimum requirement established by Basel II). 
Under the adverse scenario a loss of € 400 bn has been estimated, but in any case, the Tier 1 
ratio should have been above the capital requirements and no bank would have fallen below 
6% of capital ratio. 
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1.2.2 CEBS EU-Wide Stress Test 2010 
 
One year after the first experiment, CEBS tried to implement again the stress test technique in 
order to verify the stability condition of EU banking system. 
Learning from their mistakes, this time CEBS released the name of the banks subjected to stress 
test along with their individual results. 
The number of banks subjected to the assessment were 91 from 27 member states, representing 
the 65% of the total assets in EU banking system. 
The focus of this stress test was mainly assessing the impact deriving from credit risk and 
market risk (including sovereign debt risk) on capital adequacy. Liquidity risk was not directly 
tested. 
 
As in the previous test, there has been tested the resilience of institutions in two main macro-
economic scenarios: baseline and adverse. In addition, the losses deriving from sovereign debt 
deterioration are taken in consideration separately. 
Differently from the 2009 test, this time CEBS suited the scenario for every country included 
in the test and the assumptions became more severe in the adverse scenario. 
 
Table 1.2 shows the baseline assumption made for every stressed country.  
It is important to underline that the projection for Eurozone GDP growth was positive in both 
2010 and 2011 forecast, in particular it was 0.7% and 1.5% respectively. Notice that in the rest 
of EU projection this variable was higher, 1.0% for 2010 and 2.2% in 2011. The estimated 
unemployment rate in 2010 was 10.7% in Euro-area and 9.2 in the rest of EU, for 2011 the 
forecasts were 10.9% and 8.9%.  
The best GDP growth performance at a country level was Slovakia (1.9%) in Eurozone and 
Poland (2.9%) in the rest of EU in 2010, Ireland (2.6%) and Estonia (4.0%) in 2011. The worst 
performing countries for this variable were Greece that maintained negative GDP growth in 
2010 and 2011 for the Euro-area and Latvia that had a severe negative GDP growth in 2010 for 
the rest of EU. 
Netherlands had the best Eurozone UR prediction in both 2010 and 2011 projections (5.4% and 
6.0% respectively), Denmark had the best UR prediction in the rest of EU area (5.8% and 5.6%). 
The highest UR estimate in Eurozone was Spain with an UR over 20% and the highest UR in 
the rest of EU is Latvia. 
Respect to the previous test the baseline scenario is more optimistic, since the GDP growth 
projections were usually positive even if the UR expected was higher. 
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TABLE 1.2 / 2010 BASELINE ASSUMPTION. SOURCE: AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF THE 2010 EU WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE 
COORDINATED BY CEBS IN COOPERATION WITH THE ECB. CEBS 2010 
 
With regard to adverse scenario, a negative GDP growth of -0.2% was estimated for Eurozone 
in 2010 and -0.6% in 2011. The rest of EU forecasts of GDP growth were slightly better since 
the projections were 0.2% and 0.5% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. At a country level the best 
forecasts on GDP growth remained Slovakia and Poland, the worst Greece and Latvia. 
Concerning the UR, the forecasts were 10.8% and 11.5% in 2010 and 2011 respectively in 
Euro-area and 9.6% for both exercise year in rest of European Union.  
Table 1.3 illustrates all the assumptions of the exercise. 
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TABLE 1.3 / 2010 ADVERSE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS. SOURCE: AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF THE 2010 EU WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE 
COORDINATED BY CEBS IN COOPERATION WITH THE ECB. CEBS 2010 
 
Other variables stressed were changes in short and long-term interest rates, exchange rates 
calculated respect to USD and inflation calculated using the Consumer Price Index. 
The aggregate results of the stress test say that the Tier 1 Ratio should have increased in the 
baseline scenario, in particular from 10.3%  to 11.2% in the end of exercise. 
The decrease on the capital ratio in the adverse scenario was 0.7% from the starting point, since 
it went from 10.3% to 9.6%, in the case of a sovereign shock, a further fall would have made 
the ratio went to 9.2% at the end of the exercise period. 
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The delta between the benchmark and the adverse scenario was 200 basis points as Figure 1.2 
depicts. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2 / 2010 STRESS TEST RESULTS. SOURCE: AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF THE 2010 EU WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE 
COORDINATED BY CEBS IN COOPERATION WITH THE ECB. CEBS 2010 
 
1.2.3 EBA 2011 EU-Wide Stress Test 
 
As the two previous stress test, 2011 EU-Wide Stress Test considered a time horizon of two 
years from the starting point that is the 31st December 2010. 
90 banks were taken in consideration inside the sample and just as 2010 test the authorities 
disclosed the results both at the aggregate level and individual bank level. 
This was the first test carried out by the new-constituted European Banking Authority. 
The test kept in consideration the possibility for banks to strengthen balance sheets trough 
recapitalization and mandatory restructuring plans during the first four months of 2011. As 
result of that, in aggregate around € 50 bn were raised in this period by the sample tested banks. 
This capital raising was achieved through issuance by banks of common equity in private 
markets, government injections of capital, conversion of lower-quality capital instruments into 
CET1 capital instruments and restructuring plans approved by competent authorities. 
Regarding the assumptions of the exercise scenarios, the baseline scenario was based on the 
forecast on the economy of the European Union made by the European Commission in the 
Autumn 2010. 
According to their expectation, the short-term interest rates should have increased by 1.5% in 
2011 and 1.8% in 2012 in the euro-area. The long-term interest rates should have been 2.7% 
and 2.9% in the same period. A depreciation of dollar against the euro was considered in the 
baseline scenario, in particular the exchange rate would have been moved from 1.33 in 2010 to 
1.39 in 2011 and 2012.  
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The GDP was projected to grow over the exercise period, by 1.7% in 2011 and 2% in 2012 in 
EU, regarding the Eurozone the baseline projections were 1.5% and 1.8% respectively in 2011 
and 2012. 
 
Similarly of adverse scenarios implemented in the previous stress tests, the 2011 stress test’s 
adverse scenario is based on the baseline scenario and it is composed by three elements: a set 
of EU shocks, a global negative demand shock and a strong depreciation of USD against Euro. 
In line with the period, the first element of disorder in adverse scenario is due principally to the 
hypothesis of an aggravation of the at-the-time ongoing sovereign debt crisis. 
Country-specific bond yields shocks have been introduced in for each state member. For 
instance, yield of German 10-years bond was assumed to remain stable, while on average the 
yields of euro-area 10-years government bonds was assumed to rise of 75 basis point, 66 if the 
whole European Union is considered. 
Stock prices were assumed to fall by 15% in the euro-area and by 14% in EU. House prices 
were assumed to decrease as well, and this reduction was, as usually, calibrated for every 
country.  
 
The last endogenous internal shock concerned the European money-market: the adverse 
prediction for short-term interest rates was an average increase of 125 basis points. 
The aforementioned endogenous shocks come along with exogenous negative shocks. In 
particular, a common for every country belonging to eurozone negative consumption shock of 
1.4%, that was 4.5% for investment. The similar shocks for the rest of EU countries was less 
severe, since the consumption shock considered was 0.8% and the investment shock was 2.5%. 
For the exogenous foreign demand shock was considered a decreasing in consumption and 
investment of 2.2% and 5.6% respectively in the US economy. This shock starts in US but 
would expand in the rest of the world in two quarters. Finally, a USD depreciation of 4% during 
the test horizon was considered. 
Table 1.4 and 1.5 indicates respectively the main assumption of adverse scenario and its 
deviation from the baseline. 
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TABLE 1.4 AND 1.5 / 2011 ADVERSE SCENARIO AND DEVIATION FROM BASELINE. SOURCE: MACROECONOMIC ADVERSE SCENARIO FOR 
2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST: SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS. ECB 2011 
 
The test showed that in the adverse scenario and without a capital raising 20 out of the 90 banks 
considered in the sample would have suffered a fall in CET 1 so strong that this one would have 
been declined under the threshold of the 5% ratio with a capital deficit of €25 bn. In average, 
the CET 1 ratio would have passed from 8.9% to 7.4%. 
Considering the possible strengthen of balance sheet permitted by the authority to the banks 
subject to the test, the CET 1 would have declined from 8.9% to 7.7% on average, while only 
eight banks would have gone below the aforementioned 5% CET 1 ratio threshold. 
The overall capital deficit would have been € 2.5 bn. 
 
The figure 1.3 describes the evolution of weighted average CET 1 ratio over the exercise 
scenario in both baseline and stressed scenario. 
The figure shows how the theoretical EU recovery in baseline scenario would have led to a 
strengthen in banks’ capital position, since the difference between the starting point and the end 
date would have been 0.9 % in favour of the latter (from 8.9% to 9.8%).  
The difference between baseline and adverse scenario would have been 210 basis points. 
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FIGURE 1.3 / 2011 STRESS TEST RESULTS. SOURCE: EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY 2011 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST AGGREGATE 
REPORT. EBA 2011 
 
1.2.4 2014 EU-Wide Stress Test 
 
The 2014 EU-Wide Stress Test includes 123 banking groups across EU and Norway, that 
represent the 70% of total EU banking assets. 
EBA coordinated the test in cooperation with ESRB, the European Commission, the ECB as 
well national competent authorities. 
EBA developed the methodology and assured the disclosure of results, the ESRB and the 
European Commission produced the macroeconomic scenarios and competent authorities along 
with ECB were responsible for the quality of banks’ results. 
 
As usual, two main scenarios were taken in consideration in order to test the resilience of EU 
banking system: a baseline scenario and an adverse scenario. Considering a weighted aggregate 
average Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 11.1% at the starting point, EBA set the hurdle 
rate for the baseline scenario at 8% of CET 1 ratio and for the adverse scenario 5.5% of CET 1 
ratio. 
 
The baseline scenario was based on the economic projections made by The Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission in February 2014 as part of 
their three European Economic Forecast per year. The exercise horizon is two years long.  
From the aforementioned European Economic Forecast, the projections of the baseline scenario 
in terms of GDP evolution were a growth of 1.5% and 1.2% in 2014 for the euro-area and EU 
respectively and a growth of 1.8% and 2% in 2015. Since the European Economic Forecast 
calculated projections only for 2014 and 2015, the baseline forecast for 2016 came from a 
model-based approach by EBA. According to these projections, GDP was expected to be grown 
by 1.8% in EU and 1.7% in eurozone. 
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With regards to labour market, the Unemployment rate was forecasted to be 10.4% in EU and 
11.7% in euro-area at the end of 2015, while a further reduction was predicted for 2016, 
bringing the UR to 10.1% and 11.3% in 2016. 
The inflation expectation was 1.2% and 1% respectively in EU and eurozone in 2014 with a 
grew of 0.25% in both area in 2015. A further rise in inflation was estimated to verify in 2016, 
since the expectation were 1.5% in euro-area and 1.7% in EU. Other variables that were taken 
in consideration were house prices, long and short-term interest rates, exchange rates, stock 
prices and sovereign debt yields. 
 
The adverse macroeconomic scenario was designed to consider the main risk that imperilled 
the stability of EU banking system. In particular, four major threats were accounted: (i) an 
increase in global bond yields, (ii) a deterioration of credit quality in countries with feeble 
demand, with weak fundamentals and still vulnerable banking sectors, (iii) stalling policy 
reforms that could represent a risk for confidence in sustainability of public debt in some 
countries, (iv) the lack of necessary balance sheet repairs to maintain affordable market funding. 
The first shock considered was a government bond shock, in which, after a shock in US 
government bond market, a contagion effect involves EU-countries in differ manners, but the 
EU average shock considered in the adverse scenario would have been 150 basis point in 2014, 
110 basis points in 2015 and 2016. 
The turmoil caused by sovereign debt shock would have caused also a permanent 80 basis point 
increase in short-term interbank rates and a shock calibrated for every country in stock market 
prices that in average would have loss of 18-19 % in European Union and euro-area as well. 
The country-specific shock varies from -11% in Poland to almost -27% in Greece. 
A severe exchange rate shock was also considered, in particular in Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Croatia and Romania. 
Other shocks considered regarded corporate bond and house prices. Oil and non-oil 
commodities prices and monetary policy were considered identical to their baseline levels. 
 
The cumulative effect of these shock on GDP, with particular attention to the difference with 
the deviation from the baseline scenario, is reported in Table 1.6. 
The growth theorized in adverse scenario would have been -0.7%, -1.5% and 0.1% in 2014, 
2015 and 2016 respectively in average for EU and it would have been very similar in eurozone. 
The negative deviation from the baseline would have been in average 6.6 percentage points in 
2016 for euro-area and 7 percentage points in European Union. Netherlands and Croatia were 
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the two extremity looking at the impact of the macroeconomic adverse scenario on GDP growth 
since the first one deviation in 2016 would have been -5.4% and the second one -13.6%.     
 
 
TABLE 1.6 / 2014 STRESS TEST GDP GROWTH BASELINE AND ADVERSE PROJECTIONS. SOURCE: EBA/SSM STRESS TEST: THE 
MACROECONOMIC ADVERSE SCENARIO. ESRB 2014 
 
The impact of the scenario on price inflation is reassumed in Table 1.7. 
The estimate average impact on price inflation were 1% in 2014, 0.6% in 2015 and 0.3% in 
2016 for euro-area, whether the same impact on EU were 1.1%, 0.6% and 0% in 2014, 2015 
and 2016 respectively. The average deviation from baseline scenario calculated respect to 2016 
were -1.9% in eurozone and -2.8% considering all the EU. At a country-specific level the two 
opposite were Luxembourg with a deviation of -0.7% and Sweden with a deviation of -8.8%. 
 
 
TABLE 1.7 / 2014 STRESS TEST INFLATION BASELINE AND ADVERSE PROJECTIONS. SOURCE: EBA/SSM STRESS TEST: THE 
MACROECONOMIC ADVERSE SCENARIO. ESRB 2014 
 
The Table 1.8 depicts the impact of adverse scenario on unemployment rate for every country 
in the European Union. 
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The average deviation from baseline scenario of eurozone countries were estimated in 0.3% in 
2014, 1.2% in 2015 and 2.2% in 2016. Regarding the EU, the average deviation would have 
been 0.6%, 1.9% and 2.9% in the three years considered in the exercise. 
 
 
TABLE 1.8 / 2014 STRESS TEST UR BASELINE AND ADVERSE PROJECTIONS. SOURCE: EBA/SSM STRESS TEST: THE MACROECONOMIC 
ADVERSE SCENARIO. ESRB 2014 
 
Under the adverse scenario, the test revealed an aggregate capital loss of €261 bn, due mainly 
to a credit loss of €492 bn. In terms of capital position, the weighted average CET 1 fall was 
260 bps, in particular from 11.1% of starting CET 1 in 2013, the ratio calculated in the adverse 
scenario would have been 8.5% in 2016. 
Figure 1.4 depicts the evolution of aggregate Common Equity Tier 1 ratio in baseline and 
adverse scenario and the delta respect to the starting point of the two scenarios. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.4 / 2014 EVOLUTION OF CET 1 UNDER BASELINE AND ADVERSE SCENARIO. SOURCE: RESULTS OF 2014 EU‐WIDE STRESS 
TEST. EBA 2014 
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24 banks subject to stress test fall below the capital threshold set by EBA for this stress test, 
leading to maximum shortfall of € 24.2 bn in the adverse scenario. In particular, 9 banks were 
from Italy, 3 banks from Greece and other 3 banks from Cyprus. 
The figure 1.5 shows the evolution of number of banks failing the stress test capital shortfall. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.5 / EVOLUTION OF NUMBER OF BANKS FAILING THE STRESS TEST CAPITAL SHORTFALL. SOURCE: RESULTS OF 2014 EU‐
WIDE STRESS TEST. EBA 2014 
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Chapter Two: 2016 EBA EU-wide Stress Test 
 
Since the aim of this dissertation is the analysis of the 2016 EBA’s EU-wide Stress Testing 
market impact, this section contains a review of the methodology, the scenarios and the results 
of this test. 
 
The task of the EU-wide Stress Test is to provide a common analytical framework to compare 
and assess the resiliency of EU banks and EU banking system to shocks and losses of capital 
deriving from them. 
 
In order to verify the soundness of institution and the stability of the EU financial sector, EBA 
provided a common methodology that banks used to calculate the impact of a common stressed 
macroeconomic scenario with further constraints.  
It was a so-called bottom-up approach, since any bank had the duty to individually assess their 
capability to bear losses deriving from a worsening macroeconomic scenario under the guidance 
and support of the European Banking Authority. 
 
2.1 Key Aspects: Sample of Banks 
From the EU-wide Stress Test Methodology document released by EBA, the banks should have 
the following characteristics to be included in the stress test sample: 
 
• Banks covering broadly 70% of the national banking sector in the Eurozone, each non-
Eurozone EU member and Norway, as expressed in term of total consolidated assets as 
of end 2014. Lower representatives were accepted for countries with a wide presence of 
subsidiaries of non-domestic EU banks. 
• Banks had to have a minimum of € 30 bn in assets. 
• Competent authorities could, at their discretion, request to include additional institutions 
in their jurisdiction if they had a minimum of € 100 bn in assets. 
• Banks subject to mandatory restructuring plan agreed by the European Commission 
could be included in the sample if they were assessed to be near the completion of the 
plan. 
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The table 2.1 illustrates all the institutions subjected to Stress Test. 
 
Country  Bank 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 
 
Raiffeisen-Landesbanken-Holding GmbH 
Belgium Belfius Banque SA 
 
KBC Group NV 
Denmark Danske Bank 
 
Jyske Bank 
 
Nykredit Realkredit 
Finland OP Osuuskunta 
France Groupe Crédit Mutuel 
 
La Banque Postale 
 
BNP Paribas 
 
Groupe Crédit Agricole 
 
Groupe BPCE 
 
Société Générale S.A. 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 
 
Commerzbank AG 
 
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
 
Bayerische Landesbank 
 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
 
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 
 
NRW.BANK 
 
Volkswagen Financial Services AG 
 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale 
Hungary OTP Bank Nyrt. 
Ireland Allied Irish Bank plc 
 
The Governor and Company of the Bank of Irland 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 
 
UniCredit S.p.A. 
 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. 
 
Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa 
 
Unione Di Banche Italiane Società Per Azioni 
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Country  Bank 
Netherlands ING Groep N.V. 
 
Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. 
 
ABN AMRO Group N.V. 
 
N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 
Norway DNB Bank Group 
Poland Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski SA 
Spain Banco Santander S.A. 
 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. 
 
Criteria Caixa, S.A.U. 
 
BFA Tenedora de Acciones S.A.U. 
 
Banco Popular Español S.A. 
 
Banco de Sabadell S.A. 
Sweden Nordea Bank – group 
 
Svenska Handelsbanken – group 
 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - group 
 
Swedbank – group 
UK HSBC Holdings 
 
Barclays Plc 
 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Public Limited Company 
 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc 
TABLE 2.1 / BANKS SUBJECT TO THE TEST. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
 
2.2 Key Aspects: Macroeconomic Scenarios and other assumption 
 
Here is a recap of how EBA set macroeconomic scenarios and other key features of the 2016 
Stress Test: 
• The exercise was carried out on the basis of year-end 2015 figures, and the scenarios 
have been applied over a period of three years from end 2015 to 2018. 
• The exercise assessed the resilience of institution under a common macroeconomic 
baseline and adverse scenario. 
• The application of market risk methodology was based on a common set of stressed 
market parameters, calibrated from the macroeconomic scenario, historical experience 
and on haircuts from sovereign exposures. 
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• The credit risk methodology included a prescribed increase in REA (Risk Exposure 
Amount) for securitization exposure. 
• The impact of Stressed Scenario was measured as impact on CET 1 capital. 
• The definition of CET 1 was the one given by the CRD 2013/36/EU and CRR 575/2013. 
• The resulting impact in CET 1 of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments eligible as 
regulatory capital in CRR/CRD were not taken in consideration in the calculation of 
capital ratio. 
• A common approach for the application of prudential filters for gain and losses deriving 
from sovereign assets in the AFS (Available for Sale) portfolio was required across all 
EU-Countries. Minimum transitional requirements set in CRR applied to all EU-
Countries independently from national derogation. Non-sovereign exposure in AFS 
were treated as the domestic legislation required. 
• No hurdle rates or capital threshold were defined for the purpose of the exercise. 
• Neither the roll-out of new internal model nor the modification of existing one during 
the time horizon of the stress test were considered for the calculation of REA. 
• Banks were not required to anticipate changes to the accounting and tax regimes that 
come into effect after the launch of the exercise. 
• Assumption of a static Balance Sheet. 
• Assumption of the maintaining the same business mix during the time horizon of the 
test. 
• The approach is a constrained bottom-up Stress Test. Banks were in charge of the 
calculation of the impact of the scenarios, but they were subject to constraint and a 
review of the competent authority. 
• Banks were required to assess the following set of risks: 
o Credit Risk: including securitization; 
o Market Risk, CCR (Counterparty Credit Risk) and CVA (Credit Valuation 
Adjustment); 
o Operational Risk, including conduct risk. 
• In Addition, banks were required to project the effects of scenarios on NII (Net Interest 
Income) and to stress P&L (Profit and Loss) and other capital items not covered by other 
risk type. 
• The risks arising from sovereign exposures were covered in market risk and credit risk, 
according to accountability treatment. 
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In table 2.2, there is an overview of the methodology by risk type. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 / METHODOLOGY BY RISK TYPE. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
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2.3 Macroeconomic Scenarios 
 
In this section there is a recap of the common scenarios which any bank listed above based its 
stress test. 
As stated before, EBA and ESFS prepared two common scenarios for the stress test: a baseline 
scenario and an adverse scenario. 
 
2.3.1 Macroeconomic Scenarios: Baseline 
 
The Baseline macroeconomic scenario is based on the periodic projections made by the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) that releases their forecast 
every winter, spring and autumn. 
 
The principal scenario is the one released the 5th November 2015 that covers the period 2015-
2017. For the forecast of year 2018 a model-based approach not released by the DG ECFIN has 
been used. Also, projections of house prices are derived from a model-based approach not 
published by any institution. 
 
The euro-area GDP forecast was a growth of 1.6% in 2015, rising to 1.8% in 2016 and 1.9% in 
2017. For the EU as a whole, real GDP was expected to rise from 1.9% this year to 2.0% in 
2016 and 2.1% in 2017. 
 
Concerning the labour market, the employment forecast was a growth of 0.9% in 2015 and 2016 
and 1% in 2017 in euro area, 1% in 2015 and 0.9% in 2016 and 2017 in EU as a whole. 
Annual inflation projections were: a rise of 0.1% in the euro area and 0.0% in the EU in 2015, 
to 1.0% and 1.1% respectively in 2016, and to 1.6% in both areas in 2017. Auto-regressive 
models have been used to calculate projections for 2018. 
 
2.3.2 Macroeconomic Scenarios: Adverse Scenario 
 
 According to ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) there were four main risk that 
jeopardized the EU financial stability: 
1. An abrupt reversal of compressed global risk premia, amplified by low secondary 
market liquidity. 
2. Weak profitability prospects for banks and insurers in a low nominal growth 
environment, amid incomplete balance sheet adjustments. 
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3. Rising of debt sustainability concerns in the public and non-financial private sectors, 
amid low nominal growth. 
4. Prospective stress in a rapidly growing shadow banking sector, amplified by spillover 
and liquidity risk. 
 
In particular, the supervisory authority was concerned mainly on the first systemic risk, that 
was considered as a potential trigger to the other three risks. 
 
The table 2.4 reassumes the shocks that the risks stated above could cause. 
 
 
TABLE 2.3 / MAIN STABILITY RISKS. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-WIDE BANK STRESS 
TESTING EXERCISE, ERSB 2016 
  
The first specific shock considered by ERSB was the sovereign debt shock. The yields on long-
term Treasury securities United States were assumed to rise sharply, deviating by 250 basis 
points (bps) from the baseline by end-2016, this affects the prices of EU fixed income and in 
particular a rise of 80 basis point on ten-year German sovereign debt is estimated. 
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A contagion effect is also considered and a worsening in sovereign debt condition is also 
assumed and showed in Table 2.4. Overall a rise of 71 basis point in 2016, 80 in 2017 and 68 
in 2018 in EU long-term interest rates is assumed. 
Notice that Greece, Italy, Poland, Hungary and Romania would have the higher shock, 
Germany the lowest. 
 
 
TABLE 2.4 / 2016 LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES SCENARIO. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-
WIDE BANK STRESS TESTING EXERCISE, ESRB 2016 
 
The next specific risk European financial stability had to deal with was exchange rate risk. It 
was assumed that the exchange rate of the central and eastern European countries currencies 
would depreciate between 8% and 24% in the course of 2016 and remain stable for the rest of 
the exercise horizon period. 
On the other side Swiss Franc would appreciate of 23% against the euro. 
These exchange rate movements would have taken place despite the implied strong fundamental 
misalignment of the respective currencies that would not began to correct before end-2018. 
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Another specific risk taken in consideration was a shock on Global equity prices triggered 
mainly by the global increase in risk premia. It has been assumed a decrease of 36% in prices 
before the end of 2016.  
This shock would lead to a fall of 25% on EU stock prices in comparison with the baseline 
scenario attenuated by a weak recovery in 2018. 
These events would have effects also on commodity prices, with a decrease of oil price of 48% 
in 2016 and 44% in 2017. 
 
To complete the scenario, authorities hypothesized a rise in the money market premium of 33 
basis point in 2016, and addition of 23 basis point in 2017 and other 6 basis point in 2018. 
 
All these condition with the addition of a reduction in the availability of funding from shadow 
banking would cause a contraction in credit activity and a subsequent contraction in the 
economy. 
The results of hypothesis are reassumed on stock market are reassumed in Table 2.5. 
 
 
TABLE 2.5 / 2016 STOCK PRICES SCENARIO. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-WIDE BANK STRESS 
TESTING EXERCISE, ESRB 2016 
 
All these factors with the addition of negative foreign demand shocks have effects on GDP 
growth. This scenario would lead, according to ERSB, to an average negative EU GDP growth 
in Europe of -1.2% in 2016, -1.3% in 2017 and a small growth of 0.7% in 2018. 
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In the euro-area the adverse scenario would lead to a growth of -1.0% in 2016, -1.3% in 2017 
and 0.6% in 2018. 
The most affected countries would have been the Baltic ones and the Balkan ones. 
Table 2.6 reassumes the estimated scenario of every country in Europe. 
 
 
TABLE 2.6 / 2016 EU GROWTH SCENARIO. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-WIDE BANK STRESS 
TESTING EXERCISE, ERSB 2016 
 
A further analysis on the factors that would have affected more the reduction in GDP growth 
proved that the higher shock was due to the reduction of domestic demand in consumption and 
investment. The second cause of reduction in GDP growth was given by foreign demands 
shocks, whether the combined impact of interest rate, house price and stock price shocks were 
weaker. 
The figure 2.1 describes in detail what exposed above. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 / 2016 CONTRIBUTION OF SHOCKS ON GDP GROWTH. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 
EU-WIDE BANK STRESS TESTING EXERCISE, ERSB 2016 
 
Concerning the inflation, the adverse scenario presents a HICP (Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices) rate of -0.9% in 2016, -0.2% in both 2017 and 2018, with a reduction respect 
to the baseline scenario of -2.0%, -1.9% and -2.1% in 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively. 
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The deviation from the baseline scenario in Euro-area is -1.9% in both 2016 and 2018 and -
1.7% in 2017. The HICP would be -0.9%, -0.1% and 1.0% in 2016,2017 and 2018 respectively. 
According to the projections, Latvia and Sweden would have had the higher deviation from the 
baseline scenario, Czech Republic the lowest and Croatia was the only country with a positive 
impact. 
The first trigger would have been due to the fall in commodity prices and it was worsened by 
the subsequent contraction in domestic and foreign demand. 
Table 2.7 contains details of the forecast. 
 
 
TABLE 2.7 / 2016 HICP SCENARIO. SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-WIDE BANK STRESS 
TESTING EXERCISE, ERSB 2016 
 
The reduction of GDP growth would lead to a rise in unemployment rate. The estimated EU 
unemployment rate would be 9.9% in 2016, 10.8% in 2017 and 11.6% in 2018 with a deviation 
of 11.0%, 11.7% and 12.4% in 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively. 
The Euro-Area would have had a deviation of 0.4%, 1.4% and 2.3% respect to the baseline 
scenario in the three years of the exercise horizon. The UR would have been 11.0%, 11.7% and 
12.4% in the years considered in the forecast. 
The countries with the higher reduction would have been Poland and Latvia. 
The table 2.8 shows the projections. 
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TABLE 2.8 / 2016 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE SCENARIO, SOURCE: ADVERSE MACRO-FINANCIAL SCENARIO FOR THE EBA 2016 EU-WIDE 
BANK STRESS TESTING EXERCISE, ERSB 2016 
 
2.4 Results of 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test 
 
The 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test, on the opposite of the stress tests conducted by the FED, did 
not have a pass threshold. 
 
From Table 2.9, one can see that the weighted average reduction of CET1 Capital Ratio in the 
adverse scenario respect to the baseline scenario at the exercise end-date of the stressed banks 
is 380 basis points, specifically the average CET1 at the starting point is 13.2% and at the end 
of the stress exercise is 9.4%. 
The weighted average loss of CET1 is €269 bn. The main cause is due to Cumulative Credit 
Risk losses of €349 bn. The other losses are due to operational risk (€ -105 bn) and market risk 
losses including Counterparty Credit Risk (€ -98 bn). 
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TABLE 2.9 / 2016 KEY RESULTS. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS, EBA 2016 
 
Concerning the evolution of the Capital Ratio during the exercise time horizon, Figure 1.3 
shows the results.  
Notice that, in the baseline scenario the stressed banks increased their capital ratio by 20, 60 
and 70 basis point, while the reduction in the adverse scenario was -260 the first year, -330 the 
second and -380 the third. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2 / 2016 EVOLUTION OF CET1 IN BASELINE AND ADVERSE SCENARIO. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS, EBA 
2016 
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The Bank with the higher loss of CET 1 Ratio in the adverse scenario was Monte dei Paschi 
S.p.a. (-1443 basis points from the baseline), followed by Royal Bank of Scotland (-905 basis 
point) and Allied Irish Banks plc (-851 basis point). 
The banks that had the lower loss in the adverse scenario was DNB Bank Group (-10 basis 
point), followed by Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski SA (-182 basis point) and 
Jyske Bank (-225 basis point). 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3 / 2016 CET 1 RESULTS FOR BANKS. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS, EBA 2016 
 
From a transactional CET 1 perspective, at-the-end of the projection, only one bank presented 
a negative ratio (Monte dei Paschi), the German bank NRW was the one that performed better 
from this point of view. 
It is important to notice that, if we exclude the case MontePaschi, all banks were assessed to 
have the minimum capital requirement requested by Pillar 1 even in a stressed scenario. 
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Figure 2.4 shows the results for any single bank. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4 / 2016 CET 1 IN STARTING POINT AND ADVERSE SCENARIO. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS, EBA 2016 
 
Concerning the main drivers of the impact, Figure 2.5 shows the contribution of every P&L and 
Balance Sheet items to the CET 1 changes. 
In particular, credit losses have the greatest impact with -370 basis points. Other important 
contributing drivers that had a high impact on CET 1 were the total risk amount (-120 bps) and 
the market risk (-90 bps). 
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FIGURE 2.5 / MAIN DRIVERS TO CET1 CHANGES. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS. EBA 2016 
 
Finally, Table 2.10 displays the numerical results of the 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test in terms of 
transactional capital ratio that have been analysed above. 
 
Country  Bank 
Starting 
2015 Baseline 2018 Adverse 2018 
Δ Adverse 
2018 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 12,35% 13,85% 8,19% -416 
 Raiffeisen-Landesbanken-Holding GmbH 10,47% 12,36% 6,14% -432 
Belgium Belfius Banque SA 15,90% 17,60% 11,41% -449 
 KBC Group NV 15,17% 16,18% 11,27% -389 
Denmark Danske Bank 16,12% 17,66% 14,02% -210 
 Jyske Bank 16,09% 19,85% 14,00% -206 
 Nykredit Realkredit 19,45% 22,47% 14,19% -526 
Finland OP Osuuskunta 19,48% 21,24% 14,90% -458 
France Groupe Crédit Mutuel 15,53% 16,78% 13,54% -199 
 La Banque Postale 13,20% 14,76% 9,72% -348 
 BNP Paribas 11,05% 12,13% 8,59% -246 
 Groupe Crédit Agricole 13,52% 14,81% 10,49% -303 
 Groupe BPCE 13,02% 14,52% 9,73% -329 
 Société Générale S.A. 11,42% 11,94% 8,03% -339 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG 13,19% 12,08% 7,80% -539 
 Commerzbank AG 13,77% 13,13% 7,42% -635 
 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 16,62% 15,90% 9,68% -694 
 Bayerische Landesbank 15,23% 12,41% 8,34% -689 
 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 12,99% 13,21% 8,67% -432 
 Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 13,79% 14,42% 10,10% -369 
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Country  Bank 
Starting 
2015 Baseline 2018 Adverse 2018 
Δ Adverse 
2018 
 NRW.BANK 42,82% 39,44% 35,40% -742 
 Volkswagen Financial Services AG 11,97% 12,90% 9,56% -241 
 DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale 14,44% 14,17% 9,53% -491 
Hungary OTP Bank Nyrt. 13,41% 14,56% 9,22% -419 
Ireland Allied Irish Bank plc 15,86% 16,97% 7,39% -847 
 Bank of Irland 13,30% 16,12% 7,69% -561 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 12,98% 12,83% 10,24% -274 
 UniCredit S.p.A. 10,59% 11,57% 7,12% -347 
 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. 12,01% 12,04% -2,23% -1424 
 Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa 13,15% 14,61% 9,05% -410 
 
Unione Di Banche Italiane Società Per 
Azioni 12,08% 13,01% 8,85% -323 
Netherlands ING Groep N.V. 12,94% 12,52% 9,00% -394 
 Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. 13,49% 13,34% 8,11% -538 
 ABN AMRO Group N.V. 15,51% 16,21% 9,53% -598 
 N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 24,67% 28,05% 17,62% -705 
Norway DNB Bank Group 14,31% 16,56% 14,30% -1 
Poland PKO SA 13,27% 14,74% 11,45% -182 
Spain Banco Santander S.A. 12,71% 13,24% 8,69% -402 
 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. 12,04% 12,03% 8,29% -375 
 Criteria Caixa, S.A.U. 11,71% 11,67% 8,97% -274 
 BFA Tenedora de Acciones S.A.U. 14,57% 15,09% 10,64% -393 
 Banco Popular Español S.A. 13,11% 13,45% 7,01% -610 
 Banco de Sabadell S.A. 11,69% 12,96% 8,19% -350 
Sweden Nordea Bank - group 16,45% 18,60% 14,09% -236 
 Svenska Handelsbanken - group 21,25% 23,09% 18,55% -270 
 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - group 18,85% 21,55% 16,60% -225 
 Swedbank – group 24,14% 26,44% 22,26% -188 
UK HSBC Holdings 11,87% 12,41% 8,76% -311 
 Barclays Plc 11,42% 12,48% 7,30% -412 
 RBS Group 15,54% 15,89% 8,08% -746 
 Lloyds Banking Group Plc 13,05% 16,44% 10,14% -291 
TABLE 2.10 / 2016 TRANSACTIONAL CAPITAL RATIO CHANGES. SOURCE: 2016 EU-WIDE STRESS TEST RESULTS, EBA 2016 
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Chapter Three: Empirical Studies on Stress Test 
 
Several studies have been made about the relation between ECB Stress Test and Banks’ 
Performance.  
 
It has been proved that stress test helps to enhance banks’ transparency since stock’s prices 
reacts to supervisory announcements and inspections, this means that authority actions produce 
new information to the market (Jordan 2000, Flannery et al. 2012). 
 
According to Gick and Pausch (2012), banking authorities can optimally supervise the banking 
system through the disclosure of both stress tests results and the methodology with which these 
are conducted. 
 
Spargoli (2013) analysed why market response in US was favourable and why it was negligible 
in EU. He developed a model that explain the relation between market reaction and the ability 
of supervisor to force a recapitalization on banks that had poor stress test performance.  
The Spargoli theory deduced that in case of a disappointing performance during the stress test, 
investors force banks to downsizing by selling assets or recapitalize. However, the cost of 
recapitalization is often very high during a banking crisis, thus investors prefer the first 
alternative. Selling assets, however, could cause a deep reduction in assets value that could not 
be socially optimal respect to a bank default. 
Thus, only if the supervisor is strong enough to force a recapitalization for “bad” banks, market 
will respond positively, and the reduction of value will be avoided. 
 
A qualitative assessment of the 2009 US Supervisory Capital Assessment Program was 
investigated by Hirtle et al. (2009).  They discovered that investors appreciated the assessment, 
since the aggregate estimated capital shortfall was consistent with the estimation made by 
market analyst. 
However, Hirtle et al. claim that 2009 SCAP did not add new information but it confirmed 
market’s views of American banking system. 
 
Peristian et al. (2010) performed a quantitative analysis of the 2009 SCAP using a standard 
event study technique to establish if the “stress test” produces information demanded by the 
market. 
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Their conclusion was that even if the market had largely deciphered on its own which banks 
would have capital gaps before the stress test results were revealed, it was informed by the size 
of the gap. 
 
Neretina et al. (2014) examined the effects on returns and risks due to announcement and 
disclosure of 2009-2015 US banking stress test clarification, methodologies and results. 
According to their findings, the announcements impact equity returns in different ways for 
different stress test: the stock market response was positive in 2013 but negative in 2012. 
Also, clarification and disclosure of methodologies had a mixed impact on stock market. In 
2009 clarification had a positive impact, while the disclosure of 2011 CCAR methodology had 
a negative impact on the market. 
In contrast with Peristiani et al. (2010), Neretina et al. showed that there is no evidence of an 
impact on stock market successive to the disclosure of 2009 SCAP results. They also found a 
statistically weak evidence of a positive effects in 2012 assessment. 
 
On the other side, Candelon and Sy (2015) compared the market reactions to U.S. and EU wide 
stress test performed between 2009 and 2013.  
They found evidence of an impact on returns of tested banks. In particular, the results of 2009 
US stress test had a positive effect on performance of American stress tested banks, while 2011 
EU stress test had a negative effect on market evaluation of EU stressed banks. 
Moreover, the publication of 2009 EU Stress Test results had no response on banks performance 
due probably to the fact that the list of stress tested banks was not released. 
The publication of results of 2010 EU stress test had a positive impact on stock performance, 
while the announcement of 2012 EU capitalization exercise had a negative effect on 
performance of stressed banks (Candelon, Sy 2015). 
 
Blundell-Wingall and Slovik (2010) analysed the market impact of 2010 EU stress test and the 
role played by sovereign debt exposure in stress tested balance sheet. 
They discovered that the greatest part of the sovereign debt is held in the banking book, but the 
stress test considered only the small exposure of sovereign debt held in the trading book. 
This was the main reason of the lack of trust and consequently the absence of a significant 
reaction of the market. 
 
Cardinali and Nordmark (2011) used a standard event study technique to investigate whether 
the publication of results of 2010 EU stress test, the release of methodology and the clarification 
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by the EBA concerning capital requirement of 2011 stress test had a response on banking stock 
market. 
In particular, they examined if there was a difference in the market impact of the stressed banks, 
the next 50 non-stressed EU largest banks and the geographical division in PIIGS (Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) and no-PIIGS banks. 
According to them there is no evidence that the events analysed had impact on stock market for 
each of the group the sample was divided in. 
 
Ellahie (2012) also studied the capital market consequences of 2011 EU stress test, looking for 
changes in information asymmetry and information uncertainty. 
He proved that stress test announcement led to no change in information asymmetry and 
information uncertainty and the disclosure of results led to a decrease of information asymmetry 
but an increase in information uncertainty due to imprecision of revealed information and/or a 
worsening sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Furthermore, Petrella and Resti (2013) analysed if stress tests contribute to reduce market 
opaqueness. They tested three hypotheses. 
 Concerning the announcement date, they tested two effects:  
• Transparency effect: when a stress test is announced stock prices should rise due to the 
investors’ expectation of a reduction of opaqueness in markets. 
• Dilution effect: at the announce of a stress test, investors expect a dilution following the 
imposition upon undercapitalized banks by banking authority. This should lead to a 
decrease in the stock market. 
Regarding the results’ disclosure date: 
• Irrelevance hypothesis: once released, the results should have no impact on stock prices 
due to the lack of credibility or results technically flawed that means that stress test does 
not add new information to the market (Jenkins and Murphy, 2011). 
 
Petrella and Resti found evidence of significant market reaction both at the announcement date 
and at the results disclosure date.  The meaning is that stress tests bring new information to 
investors that were not available before the test. Moreover, there is evidence of the existence of 
a dilution effect and the authors rejected the irrelevance hypothesis. 
 
Schuermann (2014) claimed that the quality and the quantity of information disclosed during a 
stress test should depend on the state of banking system. 
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If there is a general lack of trust in banks due to low transparency of banks’ balance sheet, then 
stress tests could help to increase trustworthiness in banking system. 
Another study that examined 2010 and 2011 EU stress test was the one carried by Alves et al. 
(2014). Their purpose was to assess whether the disclosure of the outcomes had effect on the 
stock market and the CDS market as well. 
In particular, the main hypothesis they tested were: 
• Both CDS spread and stock returns anticipate stress test results; 
• The stress test results introduce new information both for stock and CDS market. 
 
In order to test the above hypothesis, they split the sample in two groups: a group formed by 
banks subject to the test and a control group of financial institutions which were not stress 
tested, after that they performed an event study methodology on both samples.  
According to them, there was evidence of a positive effect on both stock market and CDS 
market after the publication of results of 2010 EBA stress test. 
On the other hand, in the successive test they found several differences: CDS market anticipates 
the outcomes better then stock market, the announcement had a stronger impact on stock market 
rather than CDS and riskier financial institutions had negative returns. 
 
During 2014 ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment there were no significant evidence of a market 
reaction due to announcement or the publication of the results of the assessment if we include 
the full sample of tested banks (Sahin, De Haan 2016).  
The same research showed that if the sample is grouped at the country level, there is some 
evidence for a market reaction in Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain due to the 
announcement and short term (i.e. three trading days) stock market reactions in Austria, Ireland, 
Portugal due to the results. For a longer event window (from 5 to 15 trading days) there is 
evidence of stock market responses also for French, Spanish and Belgian banks (Sahin, De 
Haan 2016). 
 
Dendooven (2017) studied the long-term impact of 2014 EU-wide stress test of the disclosure 
of results on return, market risk and volatility. His findings show that the market, in general, 
reward banks with positive stress test results. 
 
The market reaction caused by the 2014 ECB Comprehensive Assessment and the 2016 EBA 
stress test were also investigated by Georgescu et al. (2017).   
Using an event study approach, Georgescu et al. showed that the outcomes disclosure reveals 
new information that are priced in markets and after the publication of results, price 
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discrimination increase, that means that the impact of the event is greater for the poorer 
performer banks. 
 
In the table 3.1, there is a brief recap of the empirical research on the argument. 
 
Research Stress Test Methodology  Results 
Peristian et al. 
(2010) 
2009 US SCAP. 
Event study 
technique. 
Confirm the 
hypotheses that stress 
test produces 
information. 
Blundell-Wingall 
and Slovik (2010) 
2010 and 2011 
EBA EU-Wide 
Stress Test. 
Analysis 
whether banks 
hold sovereign 
debt exposure 
in trading book 
or banking 
book. 
Absence of market 
reaction due to 
undervaluation of the 
role of sovereign debt 
exposure in banking 
book. 
Cardinali and 
Nordmark (2011) 
2010 and 2011 
EBA EU-Wide 
Stress Test. 
Event study 
technique. 
2010 EU stress test 
results not informative 
for the market; 2011 
EU stress test 
disclosure of 
methodology and 
clarification had no 
impact on stock 
market. 
Ellahie (2012) 
2011 EBA EU-
Wide Stress 
Test. 
Diff-in-Diff 
estimator for 
disclosure and 
announcement 
effects on 
information 
uncertainty and 
asymmetry. 
No change in IA and 
IU at announcement. 
Decrease of IA but 
increase of IU at 
disclosure of results. 
Petrella and Resti 
(2014) 
2011 EBA EU-
Wide Stress 
Test. 
Event study 
technique. 
The results are 
relevant for investors. 
Alves et al. (2014) 
2010 and 2011 
EBA EU-Wide 
Stress Test. 
Event study 
technique. 
Stock market reacted 
to disclosure of stress 
test results. CDS 
market anticipated 
results 
42 
 
Research Stress Test Methodology  Results 
Neretina et al. 
(2014) 
FED stress test 
from 2009 to 
2015. 
Event study 
technique. 
Small evidence that 
stress test affects stock 
performance of large 
US banks. 
Candelon and Sy 
(2015) 
EU and US stress 
test from 2009 to 
2013. 
Event study 
techniques. 
Usually stress test has 
positive impact in US 
and negative in EU 
stock returns. 
Sahin and De Haan 
(2016) 
2014 EBA EU-
Wide Stress 
Test. 
Event study 
technique. 
Banks’ stock returns 
and CDS spread did 
not react to the 
disclosure of results. 
Dendooven (2017) 
EBA 2014 EU-
Wide Stress 
Test. 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
technique. 
Market reward banks 
that had good results. 
Georgescu et al. 
(2017) 
EBA 2014 and 
2016 EU-Wide 
stress test. 
Event study 
technique. 
Results reveal new 
information priced by 
the market. 
TABLE 3.1 / EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON STRESS TESTS 
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Chapter Four: Methodology and Data  
 
This section incorporates the description of the data and the explanation of the methodology 
applied for the empirical analysis of the key events of the 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test and the 
impact on banks’ stock market performance. 
 
4.1 Methodology: Event Study Technique 
 
The most used technique to measure the impact of an episode on value of firm or on stock 
market performance is the so-called event study technique.  
This methodology was introduced for the first time by Fama et al. in 1969 and was revisited by 
MacKinlay in 1997.  
As prove of its extensive use, most of the aforementioned studies about the correlation of stress 
test and banks’ performance applied this methodology to perform their analysis (i.e. Petrella 
and Resti, 2014 or Sahin and De Haan, 2016). 
 
After the definition of the event of interest, the key of event study technique is to find what 
could be considered a “normal return” of an asset, that in this case is the equity return of each 
bank in the sample over 255 daily observation, and compute the “abnormal return” considered 
in a time window in which the event we want to investigate take the central spot (i.e. if we 
consider a time window of 3 days, this means we have to consider the day before and the day 
after the event we are interested in). The use of equity returns instead of stock prices solves the 
problem of an eventual positive or negative trend in the time series. 
 
To define what could be considered as normal returns, according to MacKinlay (1997), we have 
two methods: statistical and economic models. 
The sub-categories belonging to the statistical method are: 
• Market Model: it is a statistical model which relates the return of any given security to 
the return of the market portfolio. 
• Constant Mean Return Model: it considers as normal return the mean of returns of the 
time series. 
• Factor Models: they consider a number of variables to explain the variation of normal 
returns. Market model is a subcategory of  factor models. An example of multi-factor 
model is the use of an industry-specific index along with a market index. 
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The most important economic models employed in event study technique are: 
• Capital Assets Pricing Model: theorized by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1969), it is an 
equilibrium theory where the expected return of a given asset is determined by its 
covariance with the market portfolio. 
• Arbitrage Pricing Theory Model: theorized by Ross (1976), it is an asset pricing theory 
where the expected return of a given asset is a linear combination of multiple risk 
factors. 
 
For simplicity’s sake, in this section only the factors model will be explained analytically since 
it is the model that has been applied in the econometric analysis of this work. 
The factors model is based on an OLS regression between the returns of an asset or a basket of 
assets and a market index. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 ∗  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑠,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝔼 (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 0    𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) =  𝜎𝜀𝑡
2  
 
In which: 
• 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the equity return of each bank in the sample at time t. 
• 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market index return at time t. 
• 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 is the industry index return at time t. 
• 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression. 
• 𝛽1,𝑖 is the coefficient of correlation between assets’ returns and market index. 
• 𝛽2,𝑖 is the coefficient of correlation between assets’ returns and industry index. 
• 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term of each asset at time t. 
 
In the analysis of this dissertation the market index used is Stoxx 600 EU, while the industry 
specific index is Stoxx 600 EU Banks. A further description of the data employed in the analysis 
will be provided in the next paragraph of this chapter. 
The variable 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 has been calculated as the following: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 
In which: 
• 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price of bank’s stock i at time t. 
• 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the price of bank’s stock i at time t-1. 
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Once obtained the  parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖, the successive step is to find the so-called Abnormal 
Returns (AR). In order to attain the ARs we have to compute the difference between the 
observed returns in the event window we chose, and the expected normal returns given by: 
𝔼 (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖  ̂ +   𝛽1,?̂?  ∗   𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝛽2,?̂? ∗  𝑅𝑠,𝑡 
 
And the ARs are computed as the following: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,?̂? =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡  −   ( 𝛼𝑖  ̂ +   𝛽1,?̂?  ∗   𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2,?̂? ∗  𝑅𝑠,𝑡 ) 
 
Under the assumptions of Normal distribution with zero conditional mean, efficient markets 
and serial independence of ARs, the variance of abnormal return is: 
𝜎2 (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)̂  =   𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  +   
1
𝐿
  [1 +  
(𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜇?̂?)
2
𝜎𝑚2
] 
 
The third step consist in compute the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of each bank in the 
sample. CARs are composed by the sum of ARs in the event window considered. 
The analytical formula is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑡1; 𝑡2)
̂  =   ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,?̂?
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
 
Asymptotically, the variance of 𝐶𝐴𝑅?̂? is: 
𝜎𝑖,(𝑡1;𝑡2)
2  =    (𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1) ∗  𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
 
After that, we can compute the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) as: 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2) =  
1
𝑁
  ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡1; 𝑡2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
And its variance would be: 
𝑉𝐴𝑅 [𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2)] =   
1
𝑁2
 ∑ 𝜎𝑖
2 (𝑡1; 𝑡2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Under the assumption of Normal distribution: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2) ~ 𝑁[0; 𝑉𝐴𝑅 [𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2)] 
 
Knowing this, in order to test whether the CARs are statistically significative, we can perform 
a t-test in which null and alternative hypothesis are respectively: 
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• H0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2) = 0 
• H1: 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2) ≠ 0 
The mathematical formula is: 
𝑇 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2)
√𝑉𝐴𝑅 [𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1; 𝑡2)]
2
~ 𝑁[0; 1] 
 
To test the null hypothesis, we have to compare  the value of T with the Student’s t distribution 
value with n-1 degrees of freedom, where n represent the number of observation (that is the 
number of banks in the sample and in the sub-samples). 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the CARs are statistically significative and there is 
evidence of an impact of the event in the time series in the time window we considered. 
 
4.2 Sample Identification 
 
The aim of this work is to investigate whether there is a correlation between key dates of the 
2016 EU-Wide Stress Test and the market performance of the institutions involved, with a 
specific focus on which type of banks are more subject to shocks due to those events. As said 
before, according to the financial literature there are three crucial events that could have an 
impact on market performance of banks: the announcement, the disclosure of methodology 
along with stressed scenarios and the disclosure of results. 
In this dissertation all three events have been taken in consideration. In particular, the dates 
considered for the analysis are: 
• Announcement: November 5th, 2015. EBA announces details of 2016 EU-wide stress 
test, in which the authorities release the definitive list of the participants to the test after 
a first announcement about a tentative sample on July 2015.  
• Methodology: February 24th, 2016. EBA launches 2016 EU-wide stress test exercise, in 
which the authorities release officially the methodology and the macroeconomic 
adverse scenario for the 2016 stress test and formally launch the test itself. 
• Results: July 29th, 2016. EBA publishes 2016 EU-wide stress test results. 
 
Regarding the sample, the data has been collected from Eikon Datastream provided by 
Thompson Reuters. In particular the Table 4.1 contains the banks’ sample used in the empirical 
analysis of this dissertation. Banks involved in EU-Wide Stress Test but outside the analysis of 
this work are due to two reasons: the first is that there are some banks that are not listed in a 
stock exchange because it is a government subsidiary (i.e. “La Banque Postale”), or regional 
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subsidiary (i.e. all the German “Landesbank” such as “Bayerische Landesbank”), or even 
private subsidiary (i.e. “Volkswagen Financial Services AG”), the second reason is just the lack 
of availability of data from Eikon Datastream (i.e. OP Osuuskunta). 
The total number of banks analysed is 34 out of 51 institutions subject to 2016 EU-Wide Stress 
Test. Notice that plus indicates banks inside the full sample of the analysis of this work, minuses 
are outside.  
 
Country  Bank Subject to analysis 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG + 
  Raiffeisen-Landesbanken-Holding GmbH + 
Belgium Belfius Banque SA + 
  KBC Group NV + 
Denmark Danske Bank + 
  Jyske Bank + 
  Nykredit Realkredit - 
Finland OP Osuuskunta - 
France Groupe Crédit Mutuel - 
  La Banque Postale - 
  BNP Paribas + 
  Groupe Crédit Agricole + 
  Groupe BPCE - 
  Société Générale S.A. + 
Germany Deutsche Bank AG + 
  Commerzbank AG + 
  Landesbank Baden-Württemberg - 
  Bayerische Landesbank - 
  Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale - 
  Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale - 
  NRW.BANK - 
  Volkswagen Financial Services AG - 
  DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale - 
Hungary OTP Bank Nyrt. + 
Ireland Allied Irish Bank plc + 
  Bank of Ireland + 
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Country  Bank Subject to analysis 
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. + 
  UniCredit S.p.A. + 
  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. + 
  Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa + 
  Unione Di Banche Italiane Società Per Azioni + 
Netherlands ING Groep N.V. + 
  Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. - 
  ABN AMRO Group N.V. - 
  N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten - 
Norway DNB Bank Group + 
Poland PKO SA + 
Spain Banco Santander S.A. + 
  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. + 
  Criteria Caixa, S.A.U. + 
  BFA Tenedora de Acciones S.A.U. - 
  Banco Popular Español S.A. - 
  Banco de Sabadell S.A. + 
Sweden Nordea Bank - group + 
  Svenska Handelsbanken - group + 
  Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - group + 
  Swedbank – group + 
UK HSBC Holdings + 
  Barclays Plc + 
  RBS Group + 
  Lloyds Banking Group Plc + 
TABLE 4.1 / BANKS SUBJECT TO ANALYSIS. SOURCE: EBA / AUTHOR'S ELABORATION. 
In order to examine which types of banks are more subject to shocks from stress test, in this 
work the sample is subdivided in another four categories for the first two period taken into 
consideration, five for the third period: 
i. Dimension; 
ii. Capitalization; 
iii. Profitability; 
iv. Riskiness; 
v. Results (Only for the “Disclosure of results event”). 
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The method adopted for the composition of the subsamples in i), ii) and iii) was dividing the 
sample in two parts depending on whether the value of the parameter taken in consideration for 
the category (i.e. “Total Asset in euro” for the Dimension category) was higher or lower than 
the arithmetic mean of the sub-sample. 
 
The parameters used for the constitution of the sub-samples in i), ii) and iii) were respectively 
the “Total Asset in euro”, the “Tier 1 Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio” and “Pre-Tax ROE”. Notice 
the use of Pre-Tax ROE to ruling out different fiscal effects from different countries. 
For the Announcement event, data from 2014 banks’ Balance Sheet has been used, for the other 
two events, data from 2015 banks’ Balance Sheet has been used. This choice is motivated by 
the assumption that investors should rely only on public information disclosed before each 
event day. 
Regarding the Riskiness category, the average value of the 5 year of CDS of each bank in the 
period considered for the analysis was compared with the sum between the average value of the 
CDS index named “ iTraxx Europe 5 years” and its standard deviation in the same period. The 
choice of using the 5 years CDS is due to the fact that these types of instruments are the most 
traded CDS and as consequence they are the most representative of the market’s sight about the 
riskiness of the banks. 
 
For clear reasons the Results sub-samples has been created only for the Disclosure event. The 
parameter used to discretize among the banks part of the full sample was the Delta CET 1 in 
the adverse scenario with respect to the starting point. 
Table 4.2 presents the composition of the subsamples regarding the categories i), ii), iii) and v). 
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TABLE 4.2 / SUB-SAMPLE DIVISION. SOURCE: EIKON DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The green cells of table 4.2 indicates all values higher than the mean of the sample with respect 
to the parameter of the category in which the sub-sample was created. The white cells, instead, 
indicates the lower values with respect to the mean. From now on, in this dissertation, banks 
belonging to the green cells will be named high level (i.e. high ROE), banks belonging to white 
cells low level (i.e. low ROE). Thus, for instance, the sub-sample constituted by big dimension 
institutions in terms of assets will be formed by: “BNP Paribas”, “Credit Agricole”, “Societe 
Generale”, “Deutsche Bank”, “Intesa SanPaolo”, “Unicredit”, “ING Groep”, “Banco 
Santander”, “BBV Argentaria”, “HSBC”, “Barclays”, “RBS”, “Lloyds”. Instead, the sub-
sample constituted by small dimension banks will be: “Erste Group”, “Raiffeisen”, “Dexia”, 
“KBC Group”, “Danske”, “Jyske”, “Commerzbank”, “OTP Bank”, “UBI”, “Banco Popolare”, 
“Monte dei Paschi”, “DNB Bank”, “PKO”, “Banco de Sabadell”, “Caixabank”, “Nordea”, 
“Svenska”, “SEB” and “Swedbank”. The same applies for the other categories. 
 
BANK SIZE% Tier 1 2014 Tier 1  2015 RO E Pre-Tax 2014 RO E Pre-tax 2015 Delta CET1 Adverse Scenario bps
ERSTE GROUP 0,97% 10,60% 12,00% -6,90% 16,15% -416
RAIFFEISEN INT BANK 0,54% 10,80% 12,10% -1,20% 9,90% -432
DEXIA 1,05% 16,54% 16,04% -22,30% 6,55% -449
KBC GROEP 1,25% 13,90% 16,40% 15,80% 17,15% -389
DANSKE 2,16% 16,70% 18,50% 5,30% 13,40% -210
JYSKE 0,36% 15,80% 16,50% 13,80% 11,80% -206
BNP PARIBAS 9,68% 10,80% 11,70% 3,60% 11,30% -246
CREDIT AGRICOLE 7,26% 12,20% 12,20% 7,00% 6,65% -303
SOCIETE GENERALE 6,39% 12,60% 13,50% 8,20% 10,55% -339
DEUTSCHE BANK 7,66% 12,90% 12,30% 4,90% -4,95% -540
COMMERZBANK 2,41% 9,30% 13,90% 2,40% 4,40% -636
OTP BANK 0,17% 14,10% 13,30% -11,10% 11,35% -419
INTESA SANPAOLO 3,33% 14,20% 13,80% 6,60% 7,75% -274
UNICREDIT 4,09% 11,12% 11,50% 7,70% -12,10% -347
UBI 0,55% 12,33% 12,08% -7,70% -4,80% -323
BANCO POPOLARE 0,56% 12,26% 12,26% -34,50% -12,60% -410
BANCO MONTE DEI PASCHI 0,77% 8,45% 12,85% -130,30% -17,65% -1423
ING GROEP 4,40% 12,38% 14,75% 7,50% 12,25% -394
DNB BANK 1,16% 17,40% 17,40% 10,90% 11,10% -1
PKO 0,31% 11,71% 13,27% 15,30% 11,50% -182
BANCO SANTANDER 6,37% 12,20% 12,55% 14,10% 11,65% -402
BBV ARGENTARIA 3,52% 12,00% 12,00% 8,70% 11,55% -375
BANCO DE SABADELL 1,00% 11,70% 11,50% 4,60% 7,05% -350
CAIXABANK 1,65% 12,90% 12,90% 0,80% 4,40% -273
NORDEA 0,33% 17,60% 18,50% 14,60% 15,05% -236
SVENSKA 1,34% 22,10% 23,80% 16,10% 15,85% -270
SEB 1,33% 19,50% 21,30% 18,10% 12,75% -225
SWEDBANK 1,12% 22,40% 26,90% 18,50% 17,85% -187
HSBC 10,30% 12,50% 13,90% 10,00% 6,95% -312
BARCLAYS 7,53% 10,30% 11,40% 2,30% 3,55% -412
RBS 5,21% 13,20% 16,30% 4,60% -6,50% -746
LLOYDS 5,24% 15,00% 15,20% 4,00% 6,20% -291
AVERAGE 3,13% 13,67% 14,77% 0,36% 6,75% -375,56
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Regarding the category iv), Riskiness, the sub-samples made are summarize in Table 4.3. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 / RISKINESS SUB-SAMPLES. SOURCE: EIKON DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
On the opposite as above, the green cells represent  the low risk banks for each period with 
respect to the CDS index average and its standard deviation underlined in grey. Notice that the 
number of banks analysed by riskiness is fewer then the full sample presented before, this is 
due to the lack of CDS data in Eikon database. 
The number of observations that this dissertation takes in consideration is 255 daily observation 
for each period since this is the minimum number of observations recommended by Fama 
(1969) in his paper that explain the methodology implemented in this work. 
BANKS ANNOUNCEMENT METHODOLOGY DISCLOSURE
DS ITRAXX EUROPE 63,82364706 80,87148936 69,33558594
ST. DEVIATION ITRAXX 8,870325615 11,9327421 11,56169197
ALLIED IRISH BANKS 135,4047937 142,4137123 132,5154781
BANK OF IRELAND 150,7862827 160,9564843 145,4741164
INTESA SANPAOLO 91,29262678 114,3045883 93,98397477
UNICREDIT 81,78414902 92,18514043 83,56901563
UBI 117,7691294 176,1479996 137,6587105
ING 65,45 65,45 65,45
DNB 64,10999 64,10999 64,10999
BANCO SANTANDER 95,53781694 139,1126817 112,5737873
BBV ARGENTARIA 95,63316216 135,2492949 111,2681396
CAIXA 93,04999 93,04999 93,04999
BANCO DE SABADELL 141,029089 169,993697 152,2903859
NORDEA 57,32191761 68,43727357 59,13155938
SEB 51,11430471 64,24420123 53,81881688
SWEDBANK 53,54408796 64,52435523 55,01747402
HSBC 158,626 158,626 158,626
BARCLAYS 202,356 202,356 202,356
THE RBS GROUP 68,75102122 100,6896717 71,56039773
LLOYDS 89,44640024 126,6435361 90,24238355
ERSTE GROUP 151,4203873 142,3796498 145,0117488
DEXIA 190,0523784 175,0428949 171,6943762
KBC 66,45306776 57,99003357 61,08835082
DANSKE 71,19491863 66,07099332 67,14555945
BNP PARIBAS 66,48339098 77,66328362 73,40508351
CREDIT AGRICOLE 68,67226639 79,14660153 70,30250414
SOCIETE GENERALE 81,09961349 81,1133506 80,20308832
DEUTSCHE BANK 77,5518838 136,619031 84,53981086
COMMERZBANK 82,86731639 102,1880355 85,91120195
BANCO POPOLARE 173,3129263 231,8556974 187,1040793
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Concerning the event windows, this thesis considers four different time windows that, 
considering 𝑡0 as the day in which the event investigated takes place, can be reassumed as the 
following: 
• Very short period: 3 trading days (𝑡−1: 𝑡+1); 
• Short period: 7 trading days (𝑡−3: 𝑡+3); 
• Medium period: 15 trading days (𝑡−7: 𝑡+7); 
• Long period: 31 trading days (𝑡−15: 𝑡+15). 
 
Thus, the observation window went from 𝑡−270 to 𝑡−16  in order to not include observation 
inside the time window of interest in the computation of “normal” returns of the various assets. 
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Chapter Five: Results of the Empirical Analysis 
 
As stated before, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate whether the Stress Test conducted 
by the European Banking Authority in 2016 had an impact on the stock’s returns of the banks 
involved in the test during the key events already specified above: announcement of the banks 
sample, disclosure of methodology and adverse scenario, publication of results. 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical analysis will be showed.  
 
5.1 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement. 
 
In this work the date used as announcement date is the 5th of November 2015, in which the 
European Banking Authority released some important details about the imminent stress test 
they were about to conduct. 
The two main features disclosed on that day were the criteria with which EBA chose the banks 
subject to the test along with the list of the institutions involved and the draft methodology for 
discussion before the definitive methodology document was released on the 24th February 2016 
that will be investigated in the next section of this chapter. 
 
5.1.1 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Full Sample. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows a comparison during the event window between the indexes used to define 
“normal returns” trough the model already explained in chapter four, pictured in blue and 
orange, and the average stock return of the banks included in the sample pictured in grey. The 
central observation represents the day in which the event took place. 
The graph underlines that the average returns series follows in a very similar way the series of 
the Stoxx 600 banks index, while it differs from aggregate multi-industry index that is Stoxx 
600. 
This suggests that there could be a shock that led to abnormal returns and thus the event could 
have had an impact on returns.  
In  particular, there is evidence of this shock in the short period, investigated in the time 
windows of seven days and three days rather than the medium period of fifteen trading days. 
Another insight is that the banks’ returns differs from the industry index the most in the extreme 
days of observation, suggesting that the shock could have took place in the long-term time 
window. 
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FIGURE 5.1 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE RETURNS AND INDEXES, FULL SAMPLE ANNOUNCEMENT. SOURCE: EIKON 
DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
In figure 5.2, instead, there are represented the time series of the observed value in blue and the 
estimated value in orange.  
The main observation from the graph is that the observed value remains below the estimated 
value for quite all the time windows considered. Thus, we can expect a negative impact of the 
stress test’s announcement event on the returns of banks included in the sample of this work. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2 / COMPARISON BETWEEN OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, FULL SAMPLE ANNOUNCEMENT . SOURCE: EIKON 
DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Finally, Table 5.1 exhibits the full sample empirical analysis’ results.  In the first row of the 
table, we can find the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, that are simply the average of 
the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the banks included in the sample considering a certain 
time windows represented in the columns of the tab. 
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On the other hand, the second row present the p-Values of the t-test in which, as 
aforementioned, the null hypothesis is the presence of no abnormal returns or, in other terms, 
CAAR equal to zero, and the alternative hypothesis is CAAR different from zero. 
 
 
TABLE 5.1 / CAAR AND T-TEST P-VALUE OF FULL SAMPLE IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
  
The tab points out that the effect of the announcement of a stress test on banks’ stock 
performance is negative, confirming the Dilution effect already demonstrated by Petrella and 
Resti (2014) for the 2011 EU-wide stress test. In particular, the effect is stronger in the long-
term period (i.e. 31 trading days). 
Regarding the statistical significance of the test, the medium term time window of fifteen 
trading days shows no significance at all since it has a p-Value of 0.9999 that led us to do not 
refuse the null hypothesis of the presence of no Cumulative Abnormal Returns. In the short and 
very-short period (i.e. three and seven trading days) there is weak evidence of the presence of 
a shock due to the announcement of a stress test. Finally, there are strong evidence of impact 
on stock market in the long-term period. 
 
It is important to remind that the purpose of this work is not investigate whether the stress test 
announcement had an impact on banks in aggregate, since it was already examined in previous 
work (such as Georgescu et al. (2017)), but to establish which kind of bank is more subject to 
shock during this type of event. Thus, the results displayed in this sub-section must be 
considered as benchmark in the context of the analysis of the sub-categories of banks that will 
be explain in the following sub-sections of this work. 
 
5.1.2 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Dimension. 
 
The first differentiation in the sample that this work take in consideration is the division 
between big banks and small banks. The criteria with which this and the next differentiations 
have been made are already explained in chapter four.  
 
Figure 5.3 shows the correlation between the average observed and estimated return of small 
banks sub-sample. Notice that the discordance between the returns is concentrated in the central  
spot of the time window, that means that the impact had took place in the short term, but there 
is also some evidence of a shock all along the entire time series. 
 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE -0.007318428 -0.008120189 -2,20E-06 -0.03756489 34
P-VALUE 0.1759 0.1457 0.9999 0.0151 34
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FIGURE 5.3 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, SMALL BANKS ANNOUNCEMENT. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
On the opposite side, the comparison between big banks returns estimated and real returns 
pictured in Figure 5.4, evidence a different situation since the estimated returns follows in a  
quite faithful manner the time series of the observed returns. 
Thus, the conclusion of this graphical analysis is that there is no relation between big banks’ 
stock performance and the announcement event.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.4 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, BIG BANKS ANNOUNCEMENT. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.2 summarize the results of the econometric analysis on the difference between big 
banks sample and small banks sample. 
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From the econometric analysis, we can see that the average impact of the announcement event 
is negative for both sample in accordance with the results found for the full sample. The main 
difference is that only the small banks sub-sample is statistically significant at least for short 
term (i.e. 7 trading days), even if in a weakly form, and long term that present also the biggest 
shock just as the full sample case with the exception of the very-short period. 
 
 
TABLE 5.2 / CAAR AND P-VALUE OF DIMENSION SUB-SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
A possible explanation of this outcome is that traders and analysts already expected what would 
have been the big banks subject to the stress test. Expectations rely on the basis of the previous 
stress test criteria, thus the disclosure of the list of stressed big banks added no new information 
to the market. Instead, investors could have underestimated the presence of some of the smallest 
banks that were included in the EBA sample of institution subject to stress test. Thus, the 
disclosure of small banks adds new information to the market and this led to price movements. 
 
5.1.3 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Capitalization. 
 
The relation between the estimated returns of high-capitalized banks and their observed returns 
is showed in Figure 5.5.  
The figure evidence that the banks in the sample performed worse than their estimates. This 
suggests that the impact of the announcement on the stock performance of the more-capitalized 
banks was negative at least in the long term.  
 
The graph shows also small evidence of a presence of a shock in the short term since the time 
series of the observed returns follows closely the estimated one in the days in proximity of the 
announcement day. 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
BIG DIMENSION -0.005499875 -0.00219927 0.0007549134 -0.01170685 13
P-VALUE 0.5537 0.7725 0.9537 0.4441 13
SMALL DIMENSION -0.001660455 -0.01107296 0.01530029 -0.04052649 19
P-VALUE 0.7225 0.1728 0.3706 0.01381 19
58 
 
 
FIGURE 5.5 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, HIGH CAPITALIZATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
There is no graphical evidence of the presence of significant abnormal returns due to the 
announcement event of the 2016 EU stress test for the low capitalized banks, as depicted in 
Figure 5.6. 
Notice that the estimated returns are very similar to the observed one.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.6 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW CAPITALIZATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.3 presents the CAARs and the p-Values of the event study on the stock returns of the 
capitalization sub-samples.  
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Observing the p-values of both high-capitalized banks and low capitalized banks, we can notice 
that the only significative value is the long-term high capitalization CAAR which is also 
negative and the biggest in absolute terms. 
 
 
TABLE 5.3 / CAAR AND P-VALUE OF CAPITALIZATION SUB-SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR’S ELABORATION 
 
The explanation for this result is related to the fact that eight out of twelve banks that are into 
the High Capitalization sample belong also to the Small Dimension sample. Thus, this result is 
due to statistical reasons rather than economics. 
 
5.1.4 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Profitability. 
 
Looking at the observed and estimated returns plot, notice that the real returns remain below 
the estimated returns with the exception of the days that are closer to the announcement event. 
This suggests a negative shock on the medium or long term and no impact on the days 
immediately before and after the event investigated. Figure 5.7 shows this insight.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.7 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, HIGH PROFITABILITY, 
ANNOUNCEMENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
On the opposite, Figure 5.8 underlines that the estimated time series and the observed time series do not 
have a clearly defined relationship, making difficult to develop insight for the numerical analysis. 
 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH CAPITALIZATION -0.0006370479 -0.008311456 0.002188043 -0.04888865 12
P-VALUE 0.9118 0.241 0.9287 0.004765 12
LOW CAPITALIZATION -0.004770123 -0.006961962 0.01371314 -0.01677643 20
P-VALUE 0.4681 0.3929 0.225 0.2702 20
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FIGURE 5.8 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW PROFITABILITY ANNOUNCEMENT. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Following the graphical analysis, Table 5.4 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis on 
the higher and lower profitable banks sub-sample.  
As predicted before, a strongly statistically significant result is given by the long-term high 
ROE sub-sample, which is also negative as the previous graphical representation showed in 
Figures 5.7.  
It is important to notice that also the medium term analysis on low ROE sub-sample presents 
weak evidence of significance for the first time respect to all the previous cases examined 
before. 
 
 
TABLE 5.4 / CAAR AND P-VALUE OF PROFITABILITY SUB-SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The reason behind these outcomes lies on the fact that the investors look at the low profitable 
banks as more solid banks since this low profitability could be related to safer assets in the 
institution’s portfolios and as consequence, a higher chance to perform better in the imminent 
stress test. Instead, the high ROE of some banks could be due to investments on riskier assets 
and this could lead to a poorer performance during the stress test. 
Thus, investors try to anticipate the outcome of the test leading the price’s movements upward 
in  the case of lower profitable banks and downward in the case of higher profitable institutions. 
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SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH PROFITABILITY -0.00357208 -0.002644043 -0.003813797 -0.03279447 25
P-VALUE 0.5034 0.5973 0.7078 0.01435 25
LOW PROFITABILITY -0.001963574 -0.02469652 0.05655203 -0.01461865 7
P-VALUE 0.8361 0.2062 0.1213 0.5434 7
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5.1.5 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Riskiness samples. 
 
The graphical representation of the difference between observed and estimated returns of high 
risk banks is showed in Figure 5.9, that highlights the lower observed returns with respect to 
their estimates, suggesting a negative effect of the announcement on the stock’s performance 
at least for the long-term time horizon. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.9 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, HIGH RISKINESS ANNOUNCEMENT. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
On the opposite,  Figure 5.10 does not give any suggestion about the result of the numerical 
analysis of the announcement effect on the stock’s returns of less risky banks, since the time 
series of the real returns follows in a reasonably faithful manner the time series of the estimated 
returns. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.10 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW RISKINESS ANNOUNCEMENT. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
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The final considerations about the impact of the 2016 stress test announcement on the sub-
samples composed  by the institutions split by riskiness is given by the Table 5.5, in which the 
results of the econometric study are illustrated. 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that the effect of the announcement is statistically 
significant for both sub-samples in the long-term time window, even if the impact is stronger 
for the riskier institution subject to stress test. 
Furthermore, there is weak evidence of an impact on the short-run for the riskier banks. 
 
 
TABLE 5.5 / CAAR AND P-VALUE OF RISKINESS SUB-SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The immediate effect on the high risk is due to the fact that the market already assessed the 
riskiness of those institutions, thus the inclusion of the latter in the sample subject to the test is 
the new information that makes prices moves downward respect to their estimates. 
 For the same reason, in the long-run the low risk banks performed better with respect to the 
high risk institution. 
 
5.1.6 Evidence from Stress Test: Announcement, Conclusions. 
 
Finally, this sub-section contains the final remarks about the empirical analysis of the impact 
that the 2016 EU-wide stress test announcement has had on banks’ stock performance. 
 
 
TABLE 5.6 / P-VALUES ALL SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The analysis of p-values, displayed on Table 5.6, helps to understand which types of banks were 
more subject to shock due to the announcement and in which time window. 
It is clear that the effect of the event had took place in the long-period as proved by the low p-
values in the 31-trading-days’ time window.  
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH RISK -0.01146531 -0.006011138 0.003409512 -0.04263653 18
P-VALUE 0.1653 0.492 0.8778 0.1018 18
LOW RISK -0.005245608 -0.005315002 0.00615639 -0.02188156 10
P-VALUE 0.6293 0.4949 0.658 0.1347 10
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE 0.1759 0.1457 0.9999 0.0151 34
BIG DIMENSION 0.5537 0.7725 0.9537 0.4441 13
SMALL DIMENSION 0.7225 0.1728 0.3706 0.01381 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION 0.9118 0.241 0.9287 0.004765 9
LOW CAPITALIZATION 0.4681 0.3929 0.225 0.2702 23
HIGH PROFITABILITY 0.5034 0.5973 0.7078 0.01435 25
LOW PROFITABILITY 0.8361 0.2062 0.1213 0.5434 7
HIGH RISK 0.1653 0.492 0.8778 0.1018 18
LOW RISK 0.6293 0.4949 0.658 0.1347 10
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Furthermore, it is important to notice that weak evidence of a short-term shock has been found 
for the Full-sample since its p-values of the 3-days’ and 7-days’ time windows are quite low 
even if they do not reach the common p-value threshold of 0.1. Notice that this evidence was 
found only in other two sub-samples: High-Risk in the very short-term and Small Dimension 
in the short time-period. Also, notice that the only evidence of a medium-term impact has been 
observed in the Low-profitability sub-sample. 
According to the analysis, the types of banks that were affected in the long-period were: Small 
Dimension, High Capitalization and High Profitability. 
There is weak evidence of a shock in the long term for High and Low Risk banks. 
 
Table 5.7 provides the CAARs for the sub-samples, useful to understand the level of the effect 
caused by the stress test announcement of the different kind of banks. The blue fulfilled cells 
indicate the statistically significative value of  Table 5.6. 
 
 
TABLE 5.7 / CAARS ALL SAMPLES IN ANNOUNCEMENT EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The only positive effect on the banks’ stock market has been found in the Low-Profitability 
sub-sample, as afore-mentioned the explanation of this phenomenon relates to the fact that the 
low-profitability of these banks could be caused by a low level of risky activities that 
contributes to enhance the possibilities to well-perform the stress test, investors knows that and 
try to anticipate the outcome leading the price of the stock to overperform. 
The highest negative CAAR has been observed in the High-Capitalization sub-sample, this 
means that the banks that belongs to that sample were the most affected by the stress test 
announcement. 
Other high negative results have been observed in High Risk and Small Dimension sub-
samples. 
 
 
 
 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE -0.007318428 -0.008120189 -2,20E-06 -0.03756489 34
BIG DIMENSION -0.005499875 -0.00219927 0.0007549134 -0.01170685 13
SMALL DIMENSION -0.001660455 -0.01107296 0.01530029 -0.04052649 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION -0.0006370479 -0.008311456 0.002188043 -0.04888865 9
LOW CAPITALIZATION -0.004770123 -0.006961962 0.01371314 -0.01677643 23
HIGH PROFITABILITY -0.00357208 -0.002644043 -0.003813797 -0.03279447 25
LOW PROFITABILITY -0.001963574 -0.02469652 0.05655203 -0.01461865 7
HIGH RISK -0.01146531 -0.006011138 0.003409512 -0.04263653 18
LOW RISK -0.005245608 -0.005315002 0.00615639 -0.02188156 10
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5.2 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure. 
 
After announcement effect has been analysed in the previous section, this one will focus on the 
effect on the stock’s market of the 2016 EU-wide stress test disclosure of methodology and the 
scenarios with which the test has been conducted. 
The common  methodology and the scenarios for the 2016 stress test were released on the 24th 
of February 2016, which is the 𝑡0 of the analysis referring to this section. 
On this date European Banking Authority disclosed the common methodology which contains 
all the assumption that the single institutions have to take in consideration for the exercise.  
Nonetheless, the most important releases in that day were the baseline scenario and the adverse 
scenario of the European and world economy, which are the key for the conduction of the stress 
test itself. 
For further explanation, it is important to remind that the Chapter 2 of this work contains all the 
relevant information about the 2016 EU-wide stress test. 
 
5.2.1 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, Full 
Sample. 
 
As already made with  the announcement event, the focus of the first subsection is to investigate 
whether there has been a shock due to the event in question in the full-sample, after that, this 
work will examine the impact on the same sub-samples of the previous section. 
Remind that the composition of the sub-samples could be different because in this case it has 
been made according the 2015 Balance Sheet’s data of the institutions. All the explanations 
about the composition of the sub-samples are contained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 
Figure 5.11 gives an overview about the time series of the indexes which represent the base for 
the analysis and the average returns of the full sample.  This figure shows that the institution’s 
returns series follow in a quite close manner the indexes of references giving no insight for the 
numerical results of the analysis. 
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FIGURE 5.11 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE RETURNS AND INDEXES, FULL SAMPLE SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. SOURCE: 
EIKON DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Also Figure 5.12, which displays the comparison between observed and estimated returns, does 
not give strong intuition of the direction that the empirical analysis would take. 
Thus, in order to analyse the phenomenon, the numerical analysis must be taken into 
consideration rather than the graphical one. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.12 / COMPARISON BETWEEN OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, FULL SAMPLE SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
The results of the econometric analysis are showed in Table 5.8. 
The table shows that the there is an evidence of a negative effect on the banks’ stock 
performance in the short and very short time windows. 
 
 
TABLE 5.8 / CAARS AND P-VALUES FULL SAMPLE IN SCENARIO DISCLOSURE EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
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Comparison between Observed and 
Estimated Full-Sample Returns
AVG RETURN ESTIMATED AVG RETURN
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE -0.01305977 -0.01761413 -0.003698681 0.01359444 34
P-VALUE 0.03465 0.02619 0.764 0.6593 34
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As already stated in the announcement section, also in this case these results do not represent 
the focus of the investigation, but a benchmark which we rely on for the analysis of the other 
sub-samples. 
 
5.2.2 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, 
Dimension. 
 
The first sub-samples analysed for the disclosure of scenarios event are the sub-samples 
composed by the big dimension and small dimension banks. 
As usual, the first analysis is the graphical analysis between the real and estimated returns of 
the two sub-samples. 
 
Figure 5.13 shows the comparison between observed and estimated small banks returns, in 
which it is evident a discrepancy in the central days of the event. 
Thus, the expectation of the numerical analysis is that there should be a shock at least in the 
closest trading days to the disclosure of methodology and scenarios. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.13 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, SMALL BANKS SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
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The comparison between observed and estimated returns of big banks is explained by Figure 
5.14, in which there is no evidence of an impact in the short-term, but the discrepancy in the 
final part of the graph indicates that a shock could be observed at least in the long-period.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.14 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, BIG BANKS SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
Finally, Table 5.9 represents the analytical results of the Dimension sub-samples analysis. 
The table below suggests that the empirical evidence of a strong statistically significative 
impact on stock’s market in the short and very-short term for small dimension institutions, 
confirming the insight given by Figure 5.13. 
On the opposite whilst the event had no effect on small banks in the long period, big banks were 
affected by the disclosure of scenarios in a 31 trading days time window. 
Notice that, also the direction of the effect was the opposite since it was negative for the small 
banks and positive for the big ones. 
 
 
TABLE 5.9 / CAARS AND P-VALUES OF DIMENSION SUB-SAMPLES IN SCENARIO DISCLOSURE EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
There are two explanations for these results.  
The first one is that bigger the institution, more difficult for analysts predict the outcome of the 
test, thus time is needed for processing the new information communicated by EBA and as 
consequence prices need more time to adjust properly. 
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Big Banks Returns 
AVG BIG BANKS RETURNS ESTIMATED BIG BANKS RETURNS
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
BIG DIMENSION 0.003213502 -0.005383667 0.007615464 0.03315886 13
P-VALUE 0.7887 0.7503 0.7298 0.09029 13
SMALL DIMENSION -0.02243323 -0.02344781 -0.01765523 -0.03017407 19
P-VALUE 0.003245 0.008005 0.209 0.4017 19
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The second explanation depends on the fact that analysts know that the governments will not 
permit the default of a crucial institutions in term of assets and they will be always ready to 
recapitalize the institution. On the other side, small institutions could be more prone to failures, 
since they could be not large enough to justify a government intervention. 
 
5.2.3 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, 
Capitalization. 
 
Concerning the difference between the estimated and observed returns, described by Figure 
5.15, notice that there is an evidence of an impact in the stock’s market for poor capitalized 
banks. Furthermore, this shock appears to be concentrated in the central trading days of the 
analysis, which are the closest days to the event examined. 
Thus, the graph suggests a negative effect of the scenarios’ disclosure on the stock’s price of 
the low cap institutions since the real returns performed poorly with respect to the estimation. 
  
 
FIGURE 5.15 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW CAPITALIZATION SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Regarding the comparison between observed and estimated high capitalized banks returns, 
Figure 5.16 does not give any strong clue to predict the result of the empirical analysis. 
 
-8,00%
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
Comparison between Observed and Estimated 
Low Capitalized banks Returns
AVG LOW CAP ESTIMATED LOW CAP
69 
 
 
FIGURE 5.16 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  HIGH CAPITALIZATION SCENARIO 
DISCLOSURE.  AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
In Table 5.10, the results of the econometric analysis are showed.  
The only statistically significative CAARs are the ones belonging to the short and very-short 
terms low capitalization sub-sample. This proves that the disclosure of methodology and 
scenarios had effect in a negative way only on poor capitalized banks, whilst better capitalized 
banks were substantially untouched by the event. 
 
 
TABLE 5.10 / CAARS AND P-VALUES IN CAPITALIZATION SUB-SAMPLES IN SCENARIO DISCLOSURE SUB-SAMPLES. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
It is interesting to set attention on the fact that in this case the sub-samples behave in the 
opposite manner respect to the announcement event, in which the effect was long-term 
orientated, and it involved the better capitalized institutions. Thus, the market anticipated the 
expectation on the outcome of the stress test in the announcement event for the more capitalized 
banks, while it preferred to wait for the disclosure of the scenarios for the worse capitalized 
institutions. 
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AVG CAP ESTIMATED CAP
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH CAPITALIZATION -0.0009945155 -0.01221954 -0.01748958 -0.04303828 11
P-VALUE 0.9511 0.5489 0.516 0.4617 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION -0.01778648 -0.01814672 -0.002098237 0.01577043 21
P-VALUE 0.003242 0.02448 0.8669 0.3823 21
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5.2.4 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, 
Profitability. 
 
The comparison between observed and estimated low profitability returns, depicted in Figure 
5.17, shows that in general the low profitability banks performed worse than its estimates. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.17 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED  RETURNS, LOW PROFITABILITY SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
On the other side, Figure 5.18 gives indication about the discrepancies between the real and the 
predicted high ROE institutions. In particular, notice that although the real observation remains 
below the estimates as the low ROE sub-sample, they are closer to the prediction. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.18 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  HIGH PROFITABILITY SCENARIO  DISCLOSURE. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
-8,00%
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
Comparison between Observed and Estimated 
Low Profitability Returns
AVG LOW ROE ESTIMATED LOW ROE
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
Comparison between Observed and 
Estimated High Profitability Returns 
AVG HIGH ROE ESTIMATED HIGH ROE
71 
 
As usual, at the end of the sub-section there is the tab that reassumes the numerical results of 
the empirical analysis. In this case, the reference is Table 5.11.  
The table confirms the fact that in average both sub-samples performed worse that their 
prediction, but it is important to underline that only the high profitability sub-sample CAARs 
are statistically significant, nonetheless the CAARs belonging to low profitability sub-sample 
are similar or even bigger in absolute terms. 
 
 
TABLE 5.11 / CAARS AND P-VALUES PROFITABILITY SUB-SAMPLES IN SCENARIO DISCLOSURE EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The impact on the stock’s market of the event was negative for the high ROE banks in the short 
and very short period, confirming what has been already seen for the full-sample case. This 
result is similar to the one found out in the announcement case, the only difference is the timing 
of the impact: in this case short term oriented, and in the previous case in the long period. 
 
5.2.5 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, 
Riskiness. 
 
The last analysis for 2016 EU-wide stress test methodology and scenarios disclosure concerns 
the sub-samples composed by the high risk and low risk institutions. 
Figure 5.19 shows how faithfully the real returns of low risk banks follow their estimate. Thus, 
no evidence of an impact can be deducted. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.19 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW RISKINESS SCENARIO DISCLOSURE . 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH PROFITABILITY -0.01320438 -0.01354418 -0.0102568 0.00969311 20
P-VALUE 0.004564 0.03314 0.3828 0.4751 20
LOW PROFITABILITY -0.01003067 -0.02038437 -0.002609365 -0.02800869 12
P-VALUE 0.5504 0.3297 0.922 0.6315 12
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Also, high risk sub-sample presents little graphical evidence of a relation between the event and 
abnormal returns on the stock’s market, as explained by Figure 5.20. 
Thus, only the numerical analysis can give some intuitions for the hypothetical impact caused 
by the disclosure of methodology and scenarios on high and low risk banks. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.20 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  HIGH RISKINESS SCENARIO DISCLOSURE. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The Table 5.12 shows little evidence of a shock on the high risk institutions, whilst neither at 
all for the low risk ones. 
 
 
TABLE 5.12 / CAARS AND P-VALUES RISKINESS SUB-SAMPLE IN SCENARIO DISCLOSURE EVENT 
 
The impact is negative, and it is concentrated only in the central days of the time window. This 
is one of the differences with the announcement case in which not only the impact took place 
also in the 31 trading days window but also there was evidence of a shock for the lower risk 
banks. 
Furthermore, the impact on announcement was stronger in absolute terms. 
 
 
 
-8,00%
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
Comparison between Observed and Estimated 
High Risk Returns 
AVG HIGH RISK ESTIMATED HIGH RISK
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH RISK -0.01622524 -0.02003724 -0.02063617 -0.004916024 17
P-VALUE 0.1857 0.1647 0.3762 0.938 17
LOW RISK -0.006373887 -0.003629576 0.01299941 0.02680505 11
P-VALUE 0.2112 0.5046 0.3484 0.2115 11
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5.2.6 Evidence from Stress Test: Methodology and Scenarios Disclosure, 
Conclusions. 
 
The final observation about the effect of the 2016 EU-wide stress test on banks’ stock’s market 
are summarized by Table 5.13 and 5.14. 
 
 
TABLE 5.13 / P-VALUES ALL SAMPLES IN SCENARIOS DISCLOSURE EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
In table 5.13 it is clear that the event investigated in this section has had effect only in the short 
and very short term. The only sub-sample in which the scenarios disclosure had a long term 
effect was the one represented by the big dimension banks. 
In particular the most statistically significative affected institution, pictured in green, were 
Small Dimension, Low Capitalization and High Profitability, which are the same of the 
previous case. The main difference is in the timing of the shock: short term in this case, long 
term in the one analysed in the first section of this chapter. 
Notice that there is also a weak evidence of an impact in the shortest term for high risk 
institutions. 
 
After the analysis of the p-Values in tab 5.13, the next one will give insight about the size of 
the shock due to the event examined in this sub-section. 
 
 
TABLE 5.14 / CAARS ALL SAMPLES IN SCENARIOS DISCLOSURE EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.14 presents the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of all the samples investigated 
in this sub-section. Those in which a statistically relevance has been observed are pictured in 
blue cells. 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE 0.03465 0.02619 0.764 0.6593 34
BIG DIMENSION 0.7887 0.7503 0.7298 0.09029 13
SMALL DIMENSION 0.003245 0.008005 0.209 0.4017 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION 0.9511 0.5489 0.516 0.4617 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION 0.003242 0.02448 0.8669 0.3823 21
HIGH PROFITABILITY 0.004564 0.03314 0.3828 0.4751 20
LOW PROFITABILITY 0.5504 0.3297 0.922 0.6315 12
HIGH RISK 0.1857 0.1647 0.3762 0.938 17
LOW RISK 0.2112 0.5046 0.3484 0.2115 11
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE -0.01305977 -0.01761413 -0.003698681 0.01359444 34
BIG DIMENSION 0.003213502 -0.005383667 0.007615464 0.03315886 13
SMALL DIMENSION -0.02243323 -0.02344781 -0.01765523 -0.03017407 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION -0.0009945155 -0.01221954 -0.01748958 -0.04303828 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION -0.01778648 -0.01814672 -0.002098237 0.01577043 21
HIGH PROFITABILITY -0.01320438 -0.01354418 -0.0102568 0.00969311 20
LOW PROFITABILITY -0.01003067 -0.02038437 -0.002609365 -0.02800869 12
HIGH RISK -0.01622524 -0.02003724 -0.02063617 -0.004916024 17
LOW RISK -0.006373887 -0.003629576 0.01299941 0.02680505 11
74 
 
Notice that, among the last mentioned, the only positive one appears to be the long-term CAAR 
associated with the Big Dimension institution sub-sample. On the opposite, Small Dimension 
banks registered the biggest negative value. 
It is important to remark that the negative results due to the methodology and scenarios 
disclosure event are weaker than the announcement event case. 
 
5.3 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results. 
 
Finally, the last event examined in this dissertation is the 2016 EU-wide stress test results 
publication that took place on 29th July 2016. As reminder of the outcome, contained in Chapter 
2 of this dissertation, it is important to recall that, according to the EBA, the EU banking sector 
proved its resiliency, since from a starting point of 13.2% of CET 1 ratio on average, the 
theoretical loss due to the adverse scenario was 380 bps on average. 
Moreover, this analysis includes a further sub-sample investigated, that is the examination of 
whether stress test affected better performed and worse performed banks in the exercise. 
  
5.3.1 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Full Sample. 
 
This subsection contains the analysis of the full sample of banks in the disclosure of results 
event. 
 
Figure 5.21 shows the comparison between the average sample  returns and indexes in a time 
window of 31 trading days. The evidence given by the picture, is that the average returns of the 
full sample, drawn in grey, usually follows the banking index with some negative deviation in 
the days that followed the event analysed. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.21 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE SAMPLE RETURNS AND INDEXES, FULL SAMPLE DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. SOURCE: 
EIKON DATASTREAM. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
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The estimated and observed full sample returns are depicted in Figure 5.22, in which there is 
no sign of a shock due to the event in question, since the time series of the average returns rarely 
shows a significative discrepancy with the estimated average returns. 
  
 
FIGURE 5.22 / COMPARISON BETWEEN OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, FULL SAMPLE DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The table 5.15 shows the results of the econometric analysis on the full sample. In particular, 
the tab confirms the impressions given by the graphical representation in figure 5.29, that there 
is no statistical significance of a relationship between the event analysed and possible shocks 
in banking stock’s market. 
 
 
TABLE 5.15 / CAARS AND P-VALUE FULL SAMPLE IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
5.3.2 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Dimension. 
 
The first sub-sample analysed is the one composed by big banks and small banks.  
In the comparison between observed and estimated returns of big banks, pictured in Figure 5.23, 
there is no graphical evidence of a shock due to the event investigated. 
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AVG RETURN ESTIMATED AVG RETURN
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE 0.004705148 -0.01189685 -0.01511588 -0.00131751 34
P-VALUE 0.3563 0.2041 0.2605 0.929 34
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FIGURE 5.23 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, BIG BANKS DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
Also Figure 5.24, that represents the time series of the real and estimated small banks returns, 
shows no graphical sign of a relationship between the event and the stock’s returns of banks. 
Thus, only numerical analysis of the CAARs can explain the phenomenon. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.24 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, SMALL BANKS DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
At last, Table 5.16 depicts the numerical results of the econometric examination. 
The table below, prove that only small banks were subject to shock at least in the short period. 
Moreover, the shock was positive, showing a good market response on the stress test outcome. 
 
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
Comparison between Observed and 
Estimated  Big Banks Returns
AVG BIG BANKS ESTIMATED BIG BANKS
-4,00%
-3,00%
-2,00%
-1,00%
0,00%
1,00%
2,00%
3,00%
4,00%
5,00%
Comparison between Observed and Estimated 
Small Banks Returns
AVG SMALL BANKS ESTIMATED SMALL BANKS
77 
 
 
TABLE 5.16 / CAARS AND P-VALUE OF DIMENSION SUB-SAMPLES IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
In particular, the fact that small banks were more affected denotes that the test added new 
information about the resiliency of the smaller institution whether info were already available 
for investors in the case of bigger banks. 
 
5.3.3 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Capitalization. 
 
From the graphical analysis of estimated and observed high capitalized banks returns, provided 
by Figure 5.25, it is clear that on average real returns were higher than estimated ones. Thus, 
the expectation from the numerical analysis is that the shock, if present, should be positive. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.25 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  HIGH CAP DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S 
ELABORATION 
 
On the other side, as evidently showed in Figure 5.26, the expectation of a shock on poorly 
capitalized banks is negative, since in the figure in question the observed values are worse than 
their estimates. 
 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
BIG DIMENSION -0.001212475 -0.0146089 -0.01688043 -0.006948686 13
P-VALUE 0.8374 0.4337 0.2621 0.6754 13
SMALL DIMENSION 0.01155344 -0.008115347 -0.01988553 0.001286682 19
P-VALUE 0.1171 0.4086 0.3645 0.9579 19
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FIGURE 5.26 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  LOW CAPITALIZATION DISCLOSURE OF 
RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
As usual at the end of the sub-section, Table 5.17 pictures the empirical finding of the analysis.  
Evidences of statistical significance are present in the short-medium term for both of the sub-
samples. Notice also that the signs of the effects of the disclosure of results are the opposite: 
positive for well-capitalized banks and negative for poorly capitalized bank. This explains why 
the total effect on the full-sample is negligible: in some way the effects of the two sub-samples 
in question mutually annihilate themselves.  
 
 
TABLE 5.17 / CAARS AND P-VALUE CAPITALIZATION IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Furthermore, the findings have an easy explanation. The market, actually, from the outcome of 
the exercise rewards the better capitalized firms and punish the worse one. 
  
5.3.4 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Profitability. 
 
Regarding the Profitability sub-samples, Figure 5.27 gives a picture in which appears to be no 
evidence of discrepancies between the real high ROE banks’ returns and the estimates. Thus, 
no significance of a shock should be found in the empirical analysis. 
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SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH CAPITALIZATION 0.005629691 0.01058639 0.01444564 0.02801559 11
P-VALUE 0.2325 0.05584 0.1206 0.2002 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION 0.006753643 -0.02193131 -0.03600823 -0.01781226 21
P-VALUE 0.3526 0.1101 0.08171 0.3967 21
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FIGURE 5.27 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS,  HIGH PROFITABILITY DISCLOSURE OF 
RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
On the other hand, Figure 5.28 shows how in general the observed low profitable banks 
performed worse than the expectation. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.28 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW PROFITABILITY DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.18 pictures the outcome of the event study on profitability sub-samples in the disclosure 
of  results event. 
The econometric analysis underlines the insight of the graphical one. In particular, there is no 
evidence of an impact on the higher profitable institutions, whether there is evidence of shocks 
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for low ROE banks not only in the short-medium term as the capitalization case, but also in the 
longer-term at least in weak form. 
 
 
TABLE 5.18/ CAARS AND P-VALUE PROFITABILITY IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
However, the impact appears to be negative with the strongest impact in the 15-days time 
window. Thus, the investors give particular attention on how profitable an institution can be 
once assured by its solidity. 
   
5.3.5 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Riskiness. 
 
Concerning the sub-samples composed by the banks split by riskiness, Figure 5.29 depicts the 
discrepancies of the observed and estimated high risk sub-sample returns, in which the main 
insight is that the high risk banks performed worse with respect to their estimates, especially in 
the days that follows the central event. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.29 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, HIGH RISKINESS DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
With regards to the comparison between observed and estimated low risk returns, pictured in 
Figure 5.30, the situation is the opposite respect to the high risk case. In fact, the real returns 
usually stay above the returns estimated in the model. 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH PROFITABILITY 0.002374624 0.002158289 0.009672808 0.01950837 20
P-VALUE 0.4622 0.8018 0.3648 0.2799 20
LOW PROFITABILITY 0.01302172 -0.03227275 -0.06589391 -0.03800444 12
P-VALUE 0.2968 0.1128 0.03892 0.1884 12
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Thus, the empirical analysis should prove a positive impact on low risk banks and a negative 
effect on high risk banks. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.30 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, LOW RISKINESS DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS . 
AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.19 presents the results of the empirical analysis regarding the study of the high and low 
risk sub-samples. 
There is a strong empirical evidence of an impact on stocks’ market both for high risk and low 
risk institutions in the short-medium period, and in the very-short period for the low risk sub-
sample. 
 
 
TABLE 5.19 / CAARS AND P-VALUE RISKINESS IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests a negative impact on the first sub-sample and a positive one 
for the second. This proves that the outcome of the test was anticipated by the CDS, since the 
worse performing institutions in CDS market performed worse in terms of stock’s performance 
in the closest day to the event in question. 
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AVG LOW RISK ESTIMATED LOW RISK
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
HIGH RISK -0.003935357 -0.03452086 -0.03249893 -0.01512626 17
P-VALUE 0.5644 0.02943 0.08886 0.4647 17
LOW RISK 0.008243621 0.01301062 0.01544207 0.01816555 11
P-VALUE 0.06102 0.07384 0.04425 0.4218 11
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5.3.6 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Test Performance. 
 
Finally, the last sub-sample tested in the analysis of this dissertation is the one formed by the 
better-performers and the worse-performers in terms of fall of CET 1 ratio respect to the starting 
point of the 2016 stress test. 
 
From the graphical representation of the real and estimated returns of the better results sub-
sample, in Figure 5.31, it is clear that the times series of the observed performance follows 
faithfully the predicted one. 
Thus, the outcome of the econometric analysis should give no evidence of shocks.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.31 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, BETTER PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE OF 
RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Regarding the graph of the worse results returns, pictured in Figure 5.32, the insight is that the 
bad banks performed poorly before the event day, but in the closest days they excess the 
expectations, only to worsen again in the medium term. 
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FIGURE 5.32 / COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED RETURNS, WORSE PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE OF 
RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Table 5.20 gives the numerical outcome of the empirical analysis. 
 
 
TABLE 5.20 / CAARS AND P-VALUE PERFORMANCE IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
The tab above explain that there is no prove of a shock on the better performed banks during 
the stress test disclosure of the outcome in any of the time windows. 
On the opposite, there is weak evidence of a positive impact on the very-short term and negative 
on the medium term, in the analysis of the poorly performers institutions. 
 
5.3.7 Evidence from Stress Test: Disclosure of Results, Conclusion. 
 
At last, this section illustrates a general overview of all the analysis carried on about the 2016 
EU-wide Disclosure of results event. 
Table 5.21 shows the p-Values of all the sub-samples that compose the empirical research. In 
the table appears that the impact due to the event is concentrated  in the short and medium term 
with some exceptions. Thus, even if the analysis of the full-sample has a negative response in 
terms of statistical significance, in general there is evidence of a shock due to the event. 
Furthermore, comparing these results with the outcome of the already investigated events, the 
difference appears to be in the timing of the shock: long term for the announcement case, very 
short term for the disclosure of methodology and scenarios and medium term in the publication 
of the results of the test. 
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AVG WORSE RESULTS ESTIMATED WORSE RESULTS
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
BETTER RESULTS -0.0007519675 -0.007598342 -0.00836906 -0.007801698 19
P-VALUE 0.8496 0.5571 0.6329 0.6815 19
WORSE RESULTS 0.01677234 -0.01536452 -0.0337122 0.00633433 13
P-VALUE 0.1206 0.2647 0.1672 0.8214 13
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The possible explanation for this phenomenon is that in the first case analysts need time to make 
their evaluation with which they base their trading strategy. Once the banks subject to stress 
test are already disclosed, it is relatively easier for investors act on the basis of the disclosure 
of the baseline and adverse scenario, and this explain why the impact of the second event 
analysed acts in the shortest period. At last, the absence of a clear pass/fail threshold in the 
disclosure of the outcome makes market’s participants need their own evaluation of the results, 
and this lead to register an effect on the stock’s market in a medium time window. 
 
 
TABLE 5.21 / P-VALUES ALL SAMPLES IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
 
Concerning the estimation of the magnitude of the effect in question, Table 5.22 provides the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of all the samples analysed in this section with the 
statistically significative value underlined in blue. 
From the table, it is clear that the high level sub-samples performed better than the low level 
ones, and there is a sort of annihilation effect on the sub-samples of the same categories that 
lead to a null significance on the full-sample case. 
Moreover, the strongest positive effect has been registered on the low risk sub-sample in the 
medium term, while the most negative impact is given by the  low profitability sub-sample in 
the same time window. 
The main difference with the previous case is in the sign of the effect, negative for the majority 
in the first two event examined, negative in the latter. Thus, this could be a sign of financial 
market’s trustworthy restoration, that is indeed the main goal of the 2016 EU-wide Stress Test. 
 
TABLE 5.22 / CAARS ALL SAMPLES IN DISCLOSURE OF RESULTS EVENT. AUTHOR'S ELABORATION 
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE 0.3563 0.2041 0.2605 0.929 34
BIG DIMENSION 0.8374 0.4337 0.2621 0.6754 13
SMALL DIMENSION 0.1171 0.4086 0.3645 0.9579 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION 0.2325 0.05584 0.1206 0.2002 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION 0.3526 0.1101 0.08171 0.3967 21
HIGH PROFITABILITY 0.4622 0.8018 0.3648 0.2799 20
LOW PROFITABILITY 0.2968 0.1128 0.03892 0.1884 12
HIGH RISK 0.5644 0.02943 0.08886 0.4647 17
LOW RISK 0.06102 0.07384 0.04425 0.4218 11
BETTER RESULTS 0.8496 0.5571 0.6329 0.6815 19
WORSE RESULTS 0.1206 0.2647 0.1672 0.8214 13
SAMPLE/EVENT WINDOW 3 TRADING DAYS 7 TRADING DAYS 15 TRADING DAYS 31 TRADING DAYS NUMBER OF BANKS
FULL SAMPLE 0.004705148 -0.01189685 -0.01511588 -0.00131751 34
BIG DIMENSION -0.001212475 -0.0146089 -0.01688043 -0.006948686 13
SMALL DIMENSION 0.01155344 -0.008115347 -0.01988553 0.001286682 19
HIGH CAPITALIZATION 0.005629691 0.01058639 0.01444564 0.02801559 11
LOW CAPITALIZATION 0.006753643 -0.02193131 -0.03600823 -0.01781226 21
HIGH PROFITABILITY 0.002374624 0.002158289 0.009672808 0.01950837 20
LOW PROFITABILITY 0.01302172 -0.03227275 -0.06589391 -0.03800444 12
HIGH RISK -0.003935357 -0.03452086 -0.03249893 -0.01512626 17
LOW RISK 0.008243621 0.01301062 0.01544207 0.01816555 11
BETTER RESULTS -0.0007519675 -0.007598342 -0.00836906 -0.007801698 19
WORSE RESULTS 0.01677234 -0.01536452 -0.0337122 0.00633433 13
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Final Remarks 
 
In this dissertation, the impact on banking stock’s market of the 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test has 
been examined. In particular, the focus of this work was to investigate if different types of banks 
in corporate point of view reacts in different ways to the exercise. Notice that previous literature 
focused on a macroeconomic point of view, since the main aim of older works was to investigate 
whether there was an impact on stocks and if the magnitude of this effect was different among 
different countries. 
As already explained before, in this work we investigated the effect of the stress test in three 
different key periods: the announcement, the disclosure of methodology and scenarios and the 
publication of results. Four time windows have been taken into consideration in order to 
examine the impact on banks’ stock market. Also, the full sample of banks was split into several 
sub-categories to better understand whether the test had a different impact on different types of 
institutions. 
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings of the econometric examination.   
The first category investigated in this work was the one concerning the dimension of banks, in 
which the full sample was split into two sub-samples: Big Banks and Small Banks. The results 
of the econometric analysis suggest that there was indeed a shock for the smaller banks in the 
sample in all three periods, whether the stress test had an impact on bigger banks only in the 
scenarios disclosure. Furthermore, the examination indicates that the shocks were negative in 
the first two periods for small banks, positive in the last one and took place only in the short 
time window, whether the only statistically significative shock found for big institutions in 
concentrated in the long term and took place in the scenario disclosure.  
The possible explanation for the findings in the first period is that, since the test is made to 
ascertain the solidity of the whole EU banking sector and therefore big banks will for sure 
participate to the exercise, financial investors preliminary assume the inclusion of the latter 
within the sample. On the other side, there is more uncertainty in which small banks will be 
subject to examination by EBA, thus the disclosure of the list of participating banks add this 
new information to the market that prices the information in a negative way for the so-called 
“Dilution Effect” already found in previous analysis by for example Petrella and Resti (2014). 
In the second period, instead, investors already know the institutions subject to the test, and 
they made their estimates of the possible outcome of the test before the publication of the 
official scenarios with which the test will be carried out. Once baseline and adverse scenario 
were published, investors take their position immediately and this explain why the effect of the 
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test is more short-time oriented than the first period for small banks. The bigger banks, instead, 
requires a deeper analysis and this difference respect to the sub-sample is well high lined by the 
fact that the shock took a longer time to take place. Furthermore, the shock observed in big 
banks was the only positive one in the entire examination of the second period, indicating that 
investors positively reacted to the scenario disclosure for big banks. 
The small banks register a positive impact during the very-short term time window of the 
publication of results period, whether the bigger banks do not achieve the same outcome. This 
could be due to the fact that a stress test with such positive results, such as the 2016 EU-Wide 
Stress Test assured the investors of the solidity of smaller institutions, whether analysts already 
dispose enough information about solidity of bigger banking groups. 
 
The second type of banks analysed in this dissertation are the more and less capitalized 
institutions. In the announcement event, the empirical analysis shows no evidence of an impact 
on low capitalized banking groups, whether there is a statistically significative evidence of a 
negative shock for high capitalized banks. This result could appear to not have an economic 
meaning but notice that ten out of twelve banks that belong to the High Capitalization sample 
are part of Small Banks sample, thus this indicates that investors are more prone to take into 
consideration the dimension of a bank rather than the capitalization ratio when a stress test is 
announced.  
In the scenario disclosure event, instead, low capitalized banks had a negative shock in the short 
and very short term. The explanation for the timing is already well described for the previous 
category of banks. This result is more predictable than the previous one from an economic point 
of view: once investors know which banks are subject to the exercise, they penalize institutions 
that have lower probability of success in the test, that are indeed the less capitalized.  
Finally, in the last event investigated, there are empirical evidence on the fact that more 
capitalized institution performed better than lower capitalized one. This is a straightforward 
result, since once the outcome of the test is published than investors reward more solid banks. 
Moreover, notice that eight out of eleven well-capitalized banks are also in the Better 
Performance sample, showing that a good capitalization is a sign of high probability to pass the 
test. 
 
The next category of banking institutions examined is the profitability one, that is divided into 
two sub-samples: High Profitability and Low Profitability. 
In the first event analysed, the announcement, there is evidence of a shock in the long term for 
High ROE banks and in the medium term for Low ROE groups. The sign of this impact are 
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opposite. In particular, it appears to exist a positive shock for low profitability firms and a 
negative one for high profitability institutions. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is 
that investors expect that high ROE firms hold too risky positions and they penalize them in the 
market. 
The results of the disclosure of scenarios event shows evidence of a negative shock for low 
ROE institutions whether high profitable firms remain substantially untouched. This effect is 
verified in the short term, in accordance with the findings of the other categories. The 
explanation is similar to the one already expressed above, investors judge the high profitable 
firms to be too risky and gives a higher probability to underperform the exercise. However, the 
evidence says that this effect is more mitigated with respect to the first event case. 
In the last event, that is the publication of results, there is no evidence of a shock for the high 
ROE banks but a negative impact on the lower profitable ones. Investors, once assured by the 
resiliency of the single banks, base their investment decision on which bank is less profitable 
and penalize the worse performing from this point of view. 
 
The fourth category of bank analysed is the one which the full sample was split by Riskiness 
on the basis of the CDS performance of each bank. In particular, this is the last category 
common for the three events since the next one, Test Performance, can be analysed only for the 
publication of results event. 
In announcement event there is evidence of a shock in both sub-samples in the long-run and a 
shock in the shortest time window for the High Risk institutions. As predictable, even if the 
impact is negative in both cases, the shock is more severe for the high risk banks. 
In the second period analysed, only the riskier institutions were subject to a negative shock, 
whether there is no significance of an effect for less riskier ones. Thus, investors prefer to wait 
the response of the test for low risk banks, whether they immediately prices negatively the 
riskier when the EBA announces the scenarios with which the test will be conducted. 
Finally, in the period referring to the publication of results, the empirical analysis of this work 
showed positive and statistical significative abnormal returns for Low Risk banks and a 
negative impact on High Risk banks. The meaning of this outcome is that the market reward 
less riskier banks and punish higher risk institutions. 
 
The fifth and last banking category investigated in this dissertation is the one concerning the 
outcome of the 2016 EU-Wide Stress Test. For obvious reasons, this examination has been 
made only in the publication of the results event.  
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The econometric analysis showed that there is no evidence on an effect on stock’s market prices 
of Better Performance banks, but the shock has taken place only for Worse Performance banks, 
showing that investors once the results are published do not reward good banks, but they 
penalize the bad ones. 
 
At the end, here is a general overview of the main results of the work. During the announcement 
event, the main important information that has been added in the market is the presence of 
smaller banks. In fact, the reaction of the sub-sample composed by these institutions is stronger 
with respect to the other sample in the same period. Furthermore, the impact is negative, and it 
took place in the long term, showing that investors need time to properly process this new 
information.   
Instead, when the baseline and the adverse scenario are disclosed the investors can process the 
information in a smaller quantitative of time, and this is proved by the fact that the shocks 
registered in the analysis is concentrated in the short and very-short term. In addition, the 
general effect of the test on the stock’s market is weaker than the previous period, testified by 
the fact that the cumulative average abnormal returns are lower in absolute terms than the 
previous case but still negative. Moreover, the most affected type of banks are the smallest, but 
there is strong evidence of a negative impact also for low capitalized institutions. 
Finally, in the last period investors reward high level banks in terms of capitalization, low risk 
banks and penalizes the one that performed bad in the test, the riskier ones and the institutions 
poorly profitable. In particular the latter category registered the highest shock in absolute term, 
showing that despite investors do not reward high profitable banks, once assured by the solidity 
of the EU banking system, investors prices negatively the poorly performed banks. 
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TABLE 6.1 / SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. AUTHOR’S ELABORATION 
  
Sample Announcement Scenario Disclosure Publication of Results
Full-Sample
Little evidence of schock 
in short term, 
strong evidence in long-
term. Both negative.
Evidence of shock in 
short period.
Negative impact, 
stronger than Ann. 
Case.
No evidence of shock.
Big Banks No evidence of shock.
Evidence of shock in 
long-period. Positive 
impact.
No evidence of shock.
Small Banks
Little evidence of schock 
in 7-days window, 
strong evidence in long-
term. Both negative.
Evidence of shock in 
short-term. Negative 
impact
Weak evidence of 
shock.
Positive impact.
High Cap
Negative evidence of 
shock in long-term
No evidence of shock.
Evidence of shock in 
short-medium term.
Positive impact.
Low Cap No evidence of shock.
Evidence of shock in 
short-term. Negative 
impact
Evidence of shock in 
short-medium term.
Negative impact.
High ROE
Evidence of shock in long-
term. Negative impact.
Evidence of shock in 
short-term. Negative 
impact
No evidence of shock.
Low ROE
Weak evidence of shock 
in medium term. Positive 
impact.
No evidence of shock.
Evidence of shock in 
short-medium term, 
weak evidence in long-
term.
Negative impact.
High Risk 
Weak evidence of shock 
in very-short and long 
term.
Both negative with 
stronger effect on long 
period.
Weak evidence of 
shock in short-term. 
Negative impact.
Evidence of shock in 
short-medium term.
Negative impact.
Low Risk
Weak evidence of shock 
in long-term. Negative 
impact
No evidence of shock.
Evidence of shock in 
short-medium term.
Positive impact.
Better Outcome No results. No results. No evidence of shock.
Worse Outcome No results. No results.
Weak evidence of 
shock in very-short and 
medium term.
Positive impact in very-
short period, negative in 
longest period.
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